



HORN CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

NURTURING DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

CONTEXTS, CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS



HORN CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

NURTURING DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

CONTEXTS, CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

About

The Horn Center for Democracy (HCD) is an independent, not-for-profit policy advocacy and research institution based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The main objective of the Center is to foster and entrench the culture of democracy, good governance, and inclusive citizen empowerment in the HoA countries. As a think-and-do tank, the Center also engages in program implementation, mainly with objectives of policy advocacy, capacity building and convening actors on democracy and governance in the Horn of Africa. HCD aims to provide a convening platform for dialogue, coordination, and exchange of best practices at national and regional levels among national and regional CSOs, citizen movements, governments and intergovernmental regional institutions such as IGAD. In this process, the Center aims to generate evidence and identify policy options on effective ways of democratization, human rights, and governance issues.

For more information: www.horn-center.org

Acknowledgement

We want to express our gratitude to the HCD staff members and lead author Dr Dereje Feyissa- for displaying unwavering commitment towards the successful finalization of this groundbreaking research. The Horn Center for Democracy truly believes that the outcome of this report will immensely contribute towards shaping the democratization trajectory in the HoA. We are grateful for the generous financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Copyright

© 2024, Horn Center for Democracy

Copyright in the report as a whole is vested in the Horn Center for Democracy, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of HCD.

The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the HCD, its Board of Directors, members of the Advisory Council, Associates or donors.

Table of Contents

| | |
|-----------|---|
| i | List of Acronyms |
| 1 | Introduction |
| 8 | 1. Revisiting the Debate on Democracy |
| 8 | 1.1 Democracy—Commonly Named Yet Rarely Defined |
| 9 | 1.2 History and Function in Theories of Democracy |
| 14 | 1.3 Forms of Democracy |
| 16 | 1.4 Democracy—From Hegemony to Recession? |
| 21 | 1.5 Revisiting the Debate on Democracy in Africa and the Horn Region |
| 26 | 2. The Regional Context |
| 26 | 2.1 The Pervasiveness of Conflict in the Greater HoA |
| 27 | 2.2 Status and Ranking of the Horn Across Democratic Indices |
| 33 | 3. Critical challenges |
| 33 | 3.1 Nation-Building Crisis |
| 36 | 3.2 The Imbalance between State and Societal Forces |
| 39 | 3.3 The Limits of Majoritarian Democracy |
| 40 | 3.4 The Resource Curse—the Horn’s Oily Kleptocracies |
| 42 | 3.5 Weak Countries, Weak Regional Entities |
| 46 | 3.6 Strong External Interference |
| 50 | 4. Prospects of Democratisation |
| 55 | 5. Recommendations |

List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| APET | African Union High-Level Panel on Emerging Technologies |
| AU | African Union |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organization |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EPLF | Eritrean People's Liberation Front |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| FMSs | Federal Member States |
| FPTP | First Past the Post |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GHoA | Greater Horn of Africa |
| GWOT | Global War on Terrorism |
| HCD | Horn Center for Democracy |
| HoA | Horn of Africa |
| IDEA | International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| KANU | Kenya African National Union |
| NCP | National Congress Party |
| NRM | National Resistance Movement |
| PFDJ | People's Front for Democracy and Justice |
| REC | Regional Economic Communities |
| RSF | Rapid Support Force |
| SAF | Sudan Armed Forces |
| SPLA | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| SSC | Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (Dhulbahante Regions) |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UMP | Union for the Presidential Majority |
| UN | United Nations |
| CoHA | Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement |
| KNDR | Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation |
| CAGR | Compound Annual Growth Rate |
| LCP | Local Content Policy |
| EAC | <i>East African Community</i> |

Introduction

This research report is based on a baseline study conducted between November 2023 and January 2024 on the political, democratic, human rights, and good governance context in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region, commissioned by the Horn Centre for Democracy (HCD) to inform its future programming. HCD's main objective is to foster a deep culture of democracy and inclusive citizen empowerment across the HoA. HCD's undertaking of research on the Horn is further based on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD's) definition of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA; or the Horn) region consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.

The objective of this study was to identify emerging trends, opportunities, and threats to democracy, good governance, citizen participation, and human rights in the GHOA Region. To generate data for analysis, several standard qualitative research methods were used, including document or desk review, interviews, focus group discussions, and observations. Document review involved a comprehensive literature review of pertinent academic works and grey literature, as well as analyses of national, regional, and continental policy frameworks related to democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Additionally, as social media has become a major site of political contestation and public debate, the study extensively consulted online sources. Secondary quantitative data were used especially from national, regional, and global democratic indices such as Freedom House's Democracy Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, Afrobarometer's public attitude surveys on democracy and governance, and IDEA's Global State of Democracy.

Cognizant of contextual variations among countries in the GHOA, much of the data used in the analysis were based on in-depth case studies of Democratization in five of the eight countries in the region. These include Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya, with each case study consisting of context, challenges, prospects, and recommendations. The country-level reports of these five countries will be published separately as their selection for the case study was based on the complexity of specific country contexts: stalled democratic transition in Ethiopia; relative success on democratic indices in Kenya; successful social movements alternated with military coups in Sudan; externally induced and largely failed state building projects and Democratization in South Sudan; and a unique case of hybrid democracy between the informal traditional and formal state systems in Somaliland.

A total of 70 interviews were completed in the five country studies along with five regional bodies and continental institutions. This included various stakeholders from government institutions, ruling parties, opposition parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), community leaders, media actors, academics, and think tanks. The study used two formats to access data from research participants: fieldwork and remote tools. Fieldwork was conducted in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Somaliland (Hargeisa), and Kenya (Nairobi), each one-week long. Interview data collection in the remaining two countries—Sudan and South Sudan—occurred via virtual platforms (e.g., WhatsApp calls) and in rare cases, through email communications for answers to targeted questions meant to fill in gaps where poor connectivity precluded the use of remote tools. Importantly, the fieldwork in Nairobi also provided access to some Sudanese CSO representatives who were based in Kenya for safety reasons. Although not involved in a full-scale case study, some key informants were consulted to generate insights into the democratic landscapes of Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia.

The analysis proceeds in five sections. The first section revisits the conventional debate on democracy—what it is about, how it comes into being, and what makes it work. This discussion draws on Rustow’s conceptual framework for democratic transition¹, which is a genetic and dynamic model that outlines four conditions for democracy to emerge: a single background condition of national unity; a preparatory phase when social struggles emerge around key issues (i.e., the conflict phase); a decision-making phase wherein political actors agree on democratic rules of engagement (i.e., the consensus phase); and a habituation phase whereupon democracy becomes a political norm. This framework is used to understand critical challenges and democratic impediments in the GHoA region especially concerning the first two conditions, national unity and the continuous struggle between state and society of the conflict phase. Finally, this section also reflects on the two forms of democracy—majority rule and consociational democracy—making a case for a more consensus-based democratic dispensation than the prevailing majority rule for governance tailored to specific country contexts.

Section two sets the regional context, emphasising mutually reinforcing and entrenched autocratic rule, and the pervasiveness of conflicts. The GHoA region is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world, largely domestic but also growing in inter-state tension linked to domestic conflicts, creating classic examples of regional security complexes as domestic conflicts have regional spillovers

¹ Rustow, Dankwart A. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1970, pp. 337–63

and regionalization of conflicts further exacerbate domestic conflicts. The outcome of this interplay is state collapse, state fragility, and the unique perpetual birthing of new states. One of Horn's exceptionalisms is that it is the only region where colonial borders are not taken for granted, as is the case elsewhere in Africa, but rather challenged. It is only in the Horn, for instance, that two new countries (i.e., Eritrea and South Sudan) and one *de facto* state (i.e., Somaliland) come into existence with a plethora of mushrooming liberation movements, some of which espouse imagined, cross-border communities. Autocratic rule, violent conflicts, and state fragility have been translated into weak performance on democratic indices as reflected by the results of various national, regional, and international organizations' democracy measurement tools that have identified the Horn as one of the least democratic regions continentally. Kenya and Somaliland fare better on democratic indices for holding non-successive free elections (Somaliland) and establishing democratic institutions that serve as checks and balances (Kenya).

In section three, the report identifies and analyses six critical challenges of Democratization in the GHoA. One of these major challenges involves a nation-building crisis, thus lacking Rustow's 'single background condition' for Democratization to take place. Successive governments in the region have sought to build nations on faulty foundations. For example, Ethiopia and Sudan implemented nation-state projects through cultural homogenization and rigid forms of political centralization with core groups and their respective peripheries. These systems generated conflict not only between the core and peripheries but also within the core groups as well. Ethiopia has sought to redress this imbalance and foster a sense of community through a revolution and political reforms, but it is still haunted by the discourse of 'ethnic domination' from the center after half a century of engagement with 'the nationalities question.' After decades of center-periphery conflicts, Sudan has recently entered into deadly confrontations within the country's core groups, pushing it to the verge of state collapse. Ethnic tensions have also undermined national unity in Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya either expressed in the form of 'ethnic capture of the state,' or regional inequality fueling inter-ethnic conflict. Even Somalia, the envy of many other African countries for its cultural homogeneity, suffers from national unity; however, the division here is channeled through the clan level. The nation-building crisis has made the states in the region illegitimate in the eyes of many of their citizens.

Another major hurdle for Democratization in the GHoA is what Semir Yusuf calls the strong imbalance of power between state and societal forces², perhaps ex-

2 Semi Yusuf. 2022. Ethiopia's democratic predicaments State–society dynamics and the balance of power. ISS

cept in Somalia where governments are still struggling to rebuild the state after decades of collapse. The imbalance is the strongest in Ethiopia and Sudan where autocratic rule has been historically constructed, generating a centralized state with an overbearing coercive structure. In Ethiopia, coercive governance is expressed in the form of powerful political regimes despite ideological differences dominating the political space, thus blocking the emergence of what Rustow calls a continuous struggle between state and societal forces. Moments of political liberalization are very much associated with new leaders seeking new bases of legitimacy (moments of weakness) for which they momentarily 'issue' democratic rights that never evolve into a democratic transition because of the structural blockages embedded, including state-society relations. In Sudan, this imbalance is expressed in the form of the military as a powerful political institution used to undermine civilian political forces. In Kenya, we see a different dynamic at play—so-called rival political dynasties or families and the economic elites connected to them having a sticky grasp on the political landscape, thus undermining meaningful democratic participation by ordinary citizens. In Uganda and South Sudan, the imbalance between state and societal forces is expressed in the form of 'liberators' establishing vanguardist governments that begrudgingly open limited political space (i.e., Uganda) immersed in internal bickering (i.e., South Sudan). Eritrea is unique, where autocracy is complete without any pretense of accepting even a democratic facade.

Closely related to the entrenchment of autocratic rule is the electoral system that prevails, such as the First Past the Post (FPTP) system in which the winner-takes-all. This type of electoral system is ill-suited for deeply divided societies without robust democratic traditions. The stakes of losing elections are too high, as winners dominate not just politics but also the administrative arms of government which are often accompanied by preferential access to state-mediated resources. The outcome of winner-takes-all elections in deeply divided societies also tend to manifest in corporate terms not only because of symbolic politics and the issue of belonging, but also because of the feeling of being marginalized. As such, the winner-takes-all electoral system and the broader majority rule within which it is situated tends to reinforce existing conflicts and create new ones. There is an urgent need to shift away from the prevailing majority rule to consensus-based democracy such as proportional representation and inter-ethnic power-sharing arrangements at various levels, including the executive, to help create a shared sense of being within and among the countries' diverse groups and generate legitimacy of governments.

Impediments to Democratization also include the resource curse phenomenon. The discovery of globally sought strategic resources, especially oil and gold, has generated the Horn's emerging extractive sector. Reflecting a broader pattern of linking extractives and authoritarian rule in countries where democratic institutions are not in place before the discovery and exploitation of the resources, neither oil nor gold has stimulated the much-needed economic development and associated social transformation in the region, but rather reinforced autocracy to its detriment. Extractives provide ready-made cash for autocrats to fund patronage networks, unlike citizens' tax-based economies which at some point necessarily entail negotiation between the taxpayer and the tax collector. Creating this veritable extractive bonanza also puts a higher premium on the drive to acquire and maintain state power at any cost so that whoever makes it to the top position will have the levers of the lucrative economy with a political incentive to exclude contenders to power. It is not by accident that non-democratic oil-producing countries tend to be more conflict-prone, as the experiences of Sudan and South Sudan have shown.

When democracy in the Horn lacks internally favorable conditions for Democratization, external factors either play no meaningful role or reinforce authoritarian rule. Thus, and as demonstrated in the pages below, regional entities such as IGAD and continental bodies such as AU have so far played no meaningful role in Democratization in the GHoA region. Fragile states inevitably create weak regional entities, beset with protracted violent conflicts. Meanwhile, member states of IGAD show very weak commitments to building robust regional bodies, as is the case in West Africa, for instance, where Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is much more active not only in regional integration but also with a broader mandate for promoting political stability and constitutional change of government. IGAD Member States' preferred mode of engagement with each other is bilateralism rather than multilateralism and this is often pursued at the expense of regional integration schemes. On the other hand, AU has a broader mandate and resources to commit both to peacebuilding and Democratization yet has not to date demonstrated much by way of success but for limited mediation efforts. Nor has the geopolitical appeals of the GHoA region been translated into the kind of external support that Southeast Asian countries received in their early phases of Democratization. The opposite is true in the Horn. The geostrategic location of the Horn at major global waterways and commercial arteries brought more attention and strong interference of major and emerging global powers in domestic politics and regional affairs—from Western countries, China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf countries. If Western countries' engagement

with the Horn is more informed by security concerns than furthering the Democratization agenda, then the emerging powers seek only to extract economic favors or look for proxies in regional hegemonic struggles. Overall, the net result of these external interferences is negative, as it has provided more opportunities for autocracies to extract geopolitical rent and impose legitimacy rather than promote democracy.

These factors do not stand alone but are very much interrelated. For instance, when there is a huge imbalance of power between state and civil society actors, the nation-building crisis continues because the state employs oppressive measures against societal forces. The state would also impose a certain vision of political settlement for the country, which contributes further to nation-building crisis, by creating a large mass of aggrieved ethnic groups thereby contributing to more division. But then, national nation-building crises also trigger widened power imbalances between state and societal forces because aggrieved ethnic groups resist control and disempowerment, triggering more coercive measures against them in a vicious cycle. Furthermore, nearly every struggle within this cyclical conflict phase takes place not in a peaceful context but involves a lot of violence. Conflict is also related to economic crisis, and economic crisis in turn exacerbates conflicts as well. In general, the Horn's pivotal geostrategic location has attracted strong external interference by major and emerging global powers who are more interested in dealing with authoritarian, autocratic governments as willing clients and suitable for proxies to non-democratic agendas. Autocracies respond to this transactional geopolitical marketplace and the rent associated with it to further buttress their hold on power.

However, the regional democratic landscape in the GHoA is not entirely bleak. There are some encouraging developments as countries in the Horn have gradually but steadily moved towards more inclusive societies. Much of this is driven by the adoption of diversity-friendly governance structures, from federalism in Ethiopia and Somalia and devolution in Kenya to decentralization in Uganda. There has also been some degree of political liberalization, though this has not led to democratic transitions, as in Ethiopia in the wake of political reform in 2018 which enabled the emergence of democratic institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and an election board, as well as the much-needed legislative reforms that opened civic spaces. Importantly, there are national processes in most GHoA countries, which are key for Democratization to take place. These include (partial) peace agreements in Ethiopia and South Sudan, national dialogues in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, and transitional justice processes in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Each of these national processes of-

fer opportunities for political settlement with new democratic dispensations to emerge, as well as reconstruction of national identity on a more inclusive basis. The GHoA is also in an economic growth trajectory and prospects look better even with a faster rate of economic growth in the coming decades. This is important to spur economic development and social transformation connected to a higher rate of urbanization and the rise of middle classes. The rise of social movements on the street and online are testaments to the rapidly changing socioeconomic landscape of the Horn.

The last section provides recommendations based on the findings of the study with a focus on overcoming key challenges to Democratization. These include but are not limited to fostering national unity through conflict resolution and peacebuilding; rebalancing the strong power asymmetry between state and societal forces through incentivizing structures; shifting away from majority rule to more consensus-based democracies; forging sensible partnerships between the informal traditional system and the formal state system and their respective institutional corollaries; broadening democratic support beyond formal political parties to include informal pro-democracy actors; building democratic institutions of accountability in the extractive sector; and expanding and supporting the democratic mandate of regional entities and continental bodies to enhance cross-learning through regional platforms including a coherent regional engagement strategy with major and emerging global powers that goes beyond the current unilateral and zero-sum game among IGAD Member States.

1. Revisiting the Debate on Democracy

1.1 Democracy—Commonly Named Yet Rarely Defined

Precise definitions for ‘democracy’ in social science literature are hard to find and when located, they are often contested with different meanings attributed to the term depending on how it is used, by whom, and under what context. Robert Bates sheds light on the question of what is in the word ‘democracy,’ helping us understand what is fundamentally shared across definitions. He explains that, “While differing in the attributes they posit and the qualifications they impose, those who write of democracy join in emphasizing its essential property: that it is a form of government in which political power is employed to serve the interests of the public rather than of those who govern” (2010:1133).³ Mengisteab (2020) defines democracy as “a system of governance that creates mechanisms by which the general population is represented in advancing its interests in the process of decision-making.” This is very much aligned with the Greek etymology of the term democracy, *dēmokratia* (i.e., rule of the people), which was coined from the root words *dēmos* (i.e., “people”) and *kratos* (i.e., “rule”). However, who the *dēmos* are, has varied contextually and changed over time, from narrow sections of society entitled to participate in public decision-making, as in Ancient Greece, to the generation of rights allocated to various categories of people, as in Europe over a millennia later.

In his book, *Politics, Power, and Purpose: An Orientation to Political Science* (2021:107), Jay Steinmetz expands the boundaries of democracy to include norms and values: “Democracy requires a set of norms and values that affirm its place in society...[It] requires public acknowledgment, understanding, and deliberation on why we choose democracy and what specific forms a democracy should take.” This means,

...civic engagement and civic participation are not just about voting or formal democratic processes but rather include a wide range of political and non-political activities in which individuals or groups come together to solve problems and better their community. Volunteering, participating in local government, and attending community events all help bring about a vibrant public sphere. Placing value on these activities is a vital foundation of democracy.

3 Robert Bates. Democracy in Africa: A Very Short History. *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 77 (2):1133-1148 (2010)

Such an understanding of democracy goes well beyond the current preoccupations with elections in the GHoA. Construed this way, democracy consists of sets of principles that could be categorized under political rights and civil liberties, including but not limited to human rights and equality, free and fair elections, accountability and transparency, and the rule of law and citizen participation, as summarized in

TABLE 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Democracy

| | |
|--|--|
|  <p>HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All people living in a democracy have guaranteed rights, such as freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of religion, and the right to organize and take part in peaceful protests. • In most democracies, individuals are valued equally regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, language, and gender or sexual orientation. • Fundamental freedoms and equality rights are protected by National Constitutions. |
|  <p>FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adult citizens have the right to vote in elections to choose their and their families' political representatives, as well as equal opportunity to run for political office. • Obstacles to voting and threats to citizens exercising this right—including the right to peacefully contest elections—are nonexistent, both before and after electoral periods. • Elections to choose government officials occur every four to five years. |
|  <p>ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elected representatives are accountable for their actions, performing their duties according to the interests and wishes of the people, not for their own. • The press holds government accountable and aims to keep citizens informed. • Elected representatives participate in open forums like 'Question Periods' or 'Townhalls' to answer for their actions and respond to questions from both supporters and opposition parties. |
|  <p>THE RULE OF LAW</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Laws are enforced equally, fairly and consistently, meaning everyone, including government officials, the police and members of the military, must obey the law. • Governments cannot punish people unless they have broken the law without reasonable justification of a life or death or safety reason. • All citizens have a responsibility to respect the laws of the land, even if they disagree with them. |
|  <p>CITIZEN PARTICIPATION</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen participation in government is more than just a right—it is a civic duty. • Participation includes voting in elections, being an informed citizen, debating issues, attending community meetings, paying taxes, serving on juries and protesting democratic violations. • Citizen participation is designed to build a stronger democracy, not self-interested divisions. |

Source: <https://studentvote.ca/canada/wp-content/uploads/2019-The-Principles-of-Democracy.pdf>

1.2 History and Function in Theories of Democracy

Twentieth century theories of democracy first posed the question of what makes democracy work before engaging the more vexing question of how it came into

being in the first place. Three schools of thought explaining what makes democracy work dominate literature. The first connects stable democracy with certain economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence (e.g., Lipset, 1959).⁴ The second strand, also called consensus theories, dwells on the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among citizens expressed either in the form of a common belief in state fundamentals of empathy and willingness as “civic culture,” or procedural for implementation, which Ernest Barker (1945) “calls “the Agreement to Differ.”⁵ A third strand of theory relates democracy to features of social and political structure that make conflict and reconciliation essential (e.g., Lijphart, 1969).⁶ Others, such as Robert A. Dahl (1956),⁷ have asserted that stable democracies require a commitment to democratic values or rules, not only among the electorate at large but also the professional politicians. Harry Eckstein (1988)⁸ further proposed a rather subtle theory of “congruence:” to make democracy stable, the structures of authority throughout society, such as family, church, business, and trade unions, must prove themselves democratic by directly impinging on offensive processes of government.

The first comprehensive theory of democratic origins was provided by Dankwart A. Rustow (1970) with a groundbreaking work entitled “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Also called a genetic model of democracy, the Rustow model identifies historically emergent democracy conditions in various countries. This report draws on Rustow’s model of democracy in the analysis of democratic impediments in the GHoA region. Rustow divides the conditions emergent democracy into four phases: a single background condition, a preparatory phase, a decision phase, and a habituation phase. What Rustow calls a single background condition for the emergence of democracy is *national unity*: “In the minimum sense of the word, democracy simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (p. 350). National unity is listed as a background condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of Democratization, although its timing is irrelevant. Some countries might have a longer period of nationhood while others a shorter one. What is important, however, is it has

4 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1, 1959

5 Barker E. 1942. *Reflections on Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

6 Arend Lijphart. “Consociational Democracy.” *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969

7 Robert Dahl. *A preface to democratic theory*. 1956. The University of Chicago Press.

8 Eckstein, Harry. “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change.” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, 1988

come about as expressed *gemeinschaft*, or community sentiment wherein all are in the same proverbial lifeboat. Rustow's emphasis on a single background condition means "no minimal level of economic development or social differentiation is necessary as a prerequisite to democracy" and "these social and economic factors enter the model only indirectly as one of several alternative bases for national unity or entrenched conflict." Thus, an important implication of Rustow's genetic model of democracy is that it is not time- nor space-bound. In principle, democracy could emerge anywhere in the world if the previously described background condition is met—whether in developed or developing nations in the Global North or Global South.

The second condition for the emergence of democracy is what Rustow calls the preparatory phase as "The dynamic process of Democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle." Here, we find democracy born out of political struggles, not pro-democracy actors championing it or the political will of leaders:

The protagonists must represent well-entrenched forces (typically social classes), and the issues must have profound meaning to them. Such a struggle is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action (p.352).

Which form the struggle takes is an empirical question, as "the particular social composition of the contending forces, both leaders and followers and the specific nature of the issues will vary widely from one country to the next and in the same country from period to period." Rustow provides contextually variable examples. Thus, in Sweden and Turkey, key economic issues underpin the social struggle, whereas, in India and the Philippines, the prolonged contest between nationalist forces and an imperial bureaucracy over the issue of self-government may have served the same preparatory function as did class conflict elsewhere. Yet, the continuing struggle in Lebanon has been mainly between denominational groups and the stakes have mainly concerned government offices. As Semir (2022)⁹ pointed out, in Ethiopia the fundamental issue has been the power asymmetry between state and societal forces in the context of a rigid form of political centralization. Verhoeven (2023) has observed a similar issue in Sudan with a power asymmetry between military elites and civilian political forces.¹⁰

9 Semi Yusuf. 2022. Ethiopia's democratic predicaments State–society dynamics and the balance of power. ISS Monograph 209.

10 Verhoeven. H. "Surviving revolution and Democratization: the Sudan armed forces, state fragility and security

According to Rustow, “democracy was not the original or primary aim; it was sought as a means to some other end, or it came as a fortuitous by-product of the struggle”. This is the reason why countries will have different trajectories in the process of Democratization contingent upon the social struggle with specific institutional outcomes. This insight calls for the need for a tailored, country-specific approach to Democratization:

A country is likely to attain democracy not by copying the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation (p.354).

This means that Democratization needs to work around key country-specific issues of social struggle. Hence, in Rustow’s genetic model, “polarization, rather than pluralism, is the hallmark of this preparatory phase.” For democracy to emerge out of a social struggle, a country needs to meet the background condition, which is a sense of community and nationhood, lest polarization lead to political fragmentation and disintegration. “Sense of community,” states Rustow, “must not only pre-exist but also continue during the prolonged period of social struggle. What infant democracy requires is not a lukewarm struggle but a hot family feud” (p. 355).

Rustow calls the third phase of Democratization the decision phase, involving “a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure.” The reasons why leaders of contending forces decide to converge rather than continue polarization vary based on context. In some cases, especially among incumbent leaders, the fear of losing more than would be gained should they continue, the fight might be the case. Opponents may compromise for whatever concession when the prospect of gaining more exists. In other cases, mutual exhaustion might force contending forces to negotiate and compromise, hence, “Democracy, like any collective human action, is likely to stem from a large variety of mixed motives. What matters at the decision stage is not what values the leaders hold dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they are willing to take” (pp.355-56).

The fourth and last phase in Rustow's genetic model of democracy is what he calls habituation:

A distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it. Democracy is by definition a competitive process, and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalize their commitment to it, and an even greater edge to those who sincerely believe in it (P.358).

Habituation for democratic settlement with painful concessions is further reinforced by a generational shift wherein those who made the painful concession will be replaced by a new generation with democratic sensibilities:

This means the very process of democracy institutes a double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties. But politics consists not only of competition for office. It is, above all, a process for resolving conflicts within human groups that arise from the clash of interests or uncertainty about the future (ibid).

Here, democracy is construed as mutual learning reinforced by the affordances of conciliation and accommodation:

With its basic practice of multilateral debate, democracy in particular involves a process of trial and error, a joint learning experience. The first grand compromise that establishes democracy, if it proves at all viable, is in itself proof of the efficacy of the principle of conciliation and accommodation. The first success, therefore, may encourage contending political forces and their leaders to submit other major questions to resolution by democratic procedures. (p.360)

Rustow's genetic model thus evolves from national unity as a single background condition, through struggle, compromise, and habituation to democracy. It does not require other preconditions for Democratization to take root. The social circumstances or psychological motivations that may furnish each phase have been left wide open. Specifically, the model rejects what is sometimes proposed as preconditions of democracy, e.g., high levels of economic and social development or a prior consensus either on fundamentals or on the rules of procedure. However, economic growth may be one of many circumstances that produces the tensions

essential to the preparatory or conflict phase. Further, mass education and social welfare services are more likely to be the result of Democratization. Rustow's model is, therefore, appropriately titled "dynamic" in his seminal article in two senses. Namely, not only does it proceed from national unity, struggle, consensus, and habituation, but also from contentious issues in which social protagonists change over time:

New issues will always emerge and new conflicts threaten the newly won agreements. The characteristic procedures of democracy include a host of devices for expressing conflict and thereby resolving it. The essence of democracy is the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever-changing issues and amidst ever-changing alignments (p.363).

The democratic dispensation is very different from autocratic rule which inherently enforces unanimity in fundamentals and procedures as a precursor to other business. Alternatively, democracy "is that form of government that derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one-half of the governed." By this definition, GHoA would benefit from democratic form of governance than autocratic rule.

1.3 Forms of Democracy

By and large, democracy takes two forms: majoritarian and consociational. The FPTP or winner-takes-all electoral system prevails in majority rule which was first developed in England in the 17th century and then spread to the American colonies, thus called the Anglo-American democratic tradition. In terms of mainstream Western political thought dating back to the writings of John Stuart Mill in the early 19th century, democracy means "majority rule while respecting minority rights." It further, according to Mill, combines two crucial propositions regarding who rules and how such that the majority makes decisions for the whole community with respect for the rights and interests of the outvoted minority. Thus, the majority principle is theoretically reduced to being a process of authoritarian decision-making. Thomas Jefferson further justified majority rule when he said, "All men are created equal," hence the One man, One vote precept. By this Lincoln meant decisions are made in a democracy based on prevalent public opinion as a recourse to the inherent equality between human beings. In this sense, the vote of three people must amount to more than the vote of two, meaning that majority rule must be committed to the legal and political protection of minority rights to avoid the possibility of majoritarian tyranny. Connectedly, the meaningful control of government by the governed depends upon the existence of shared non-governmental power amongst the numerous party and interest group polity. Taken together, true democracy can only survive within the context of a constitu-

tionalized democracy embedded in a deep-rooted democratic political culture.¹¹

Consociationalism on the other hand is a form of democracy that promotes a sort of no-majority decision-making, where decisions are, as much as possible, made by 'consensus.' The genealogy of consociational ideas date back to the 1960s. It is refined by and identified with prominent consociational scholar Arend Lijphart,¹² who emphatically argued that majority rule works only where two conditions are met. The first condition is that there be a reasonable chance of the minority becoming a majority. The second requirement is that the society be fairly homogeneous. Consociational scholars argue that majority rule does not work in deeply divided societies based on ethnicity, religion, ideology, and/or other major social cleavages. This is because societies characterized by sharp cleavages have no reasonable chance for current minorities to change into future majorities through political realignment or shifting alliances of 'governing coalitions.' In such contexts, consensus democracy creates a better and more stable democratic order. Considering, proponents of consociational democracy specifically support countries where Rustow's 'single background condition' of national unity is missing. In contexts where deep division exists, consociational democracy is said to provide four pillars of support: (1) executive power sharing in the form of grand coalitions, (2) mutual veto (minority veto), (3) proportionality (i.e., all societal groups have a role in government proportionate to their population size including votes as in election), and (4) segmental or communal autonomy in which decision-making is delegated to the numerous social groups as much as possible.

While consociational scholars criticize majority rule as inapplicable in deeply divided societies, consociationalism itself has been criticized for having implementation and efficacy problems. Horowitz (2014),¹³ for instance, identified three challenges that consociational democracy and other interethnic conciliation models broadly face. Namely, he listed the problems of adoption, degradation, and immobilization. Horowitz argues that interethnic accommodations are rarely adopted. Moreover, very little is known about the conditions under which particular prescriptions for severely divided societies can be adopted due to what he calls asymmetric preferences: "Majorities want majority rule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently, minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not." This means a consociational regime can be adopted only when majorities (or large pluralities) are momentarily weak, often after periods

11 W B Vosloo - Wollongong . 2023. The Majority Principle in Democratic Ideology.

12 Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969

13 Donald Horowitz. 'Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems'. *Journal of Democracy*. Volume 25, Number 2 April 2014

of extended violence. Yet, those majorities might again change their mind back toward the previous status quo once they regain their strength while minorities simultaneously weigh other options, including a relapse to armed struggle. Horowitz's degradation problem relates to the potential destruction of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalitions. Last, but not least, he identifies the immobilization problem: “

An interethnic arrangement of any sort allows ethnic demands and counterdemands to be made, but a consociational dispensation allows each participating group to block the claims and demands of other groups. The result is a system frequently immobilized concerning the very questions the agreement was made to settle. The stalemate, inability to get things done, and serious immobilism that can follow give rise to a desire on the part of majorities to modify the consociational agreement (pp.11–12).

The mechanisms of exit under situations of stalemate are also unspecified. Successful exit occurred in the Netherlands and Austria; however, these were not deeply divided societies but confessional cleavages which were overcome with profound socioeconomic changes which outlived the relevance of consociational democracy. Consociational democracy is also criticized as potentially freezing contending identities and excluding citizens who do not identify with ethnic groups or other collectives.¹⁴ Where consociational democracy in its various power-sharing forms has worked well is in the context of civil war and as a post-conflict resolution mechanism, as in the 2007 post-electoral violence in Kenya. Other scholars recommend a selective adoption of consociational pillars tailored to country-specific contexts. The limitations of consociational democracy should generally be viewed relationally as a ‘lesser evil’ to majority rule in deeply divided societies as the latter simply exacerbates existing societal divisions, hence producing more conflict, not compromise.

1.4 Democracy—From Hegemony to Recession?

Democracy as a hegemonic form of political order has a shorter pedigree, occurring in waves. The first wave, referred to as “Jacksonian democracy,” began in the early 20th century when suffrage was granted to white male majority in the United States and lasted until 1926. The second wave began following the Allied Victory in World War II when democracy spread to 29 countries. Third wave hegemonic de-

¹⁴ Stojanović, Nenad. “Democracy, Ethnocracy and Consociational Democracy.” *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2020, pp. 30–43.

mocracy began with the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the late-1970s Spanish transition to democracy. When the third wave began in 1974, only about 30% of the world's independent states met the criteria of electoral democracy. In the subsequent three decades, ca. 1975–2007, democracy expanded remarkably on a global scale, paralleled by a similarly steady and significant expansion in levels of freedom in political rights and civil liberties, as the following graph shows (fig. 1).¹⁵




Figure 1. Number of countries experiencing authorization and Democratization

since 1900. Source: Vanessa A. Boese, Staffan I. Lindberg & Anna Lührmann Waves of Autocratization and Democratization: A Rejoinder. *Democratization*, p.5 Steinmetz offers three justifications why democracy is a preferred mode of governance including that it is an effective system for aggregating political preferences (i.e., aggregative), values self-rule for providing an area for discussion, compromise, and consensus (i.e., deliberative), and gives individuals power to make government responsible and accountable to their needs (i.e., radical). Given this, the globalization of democracy and majority rule has occurred hand in hand. according to the Anglo-American version. Democratic expansion has nevertheless had its detractors in non-Western societies, especially where it is devoid of the conditions that Rustow outlined. To date, the strongest criticism of liberal democracy anchored with the notion of ‘one man, one vote’ and ‘majority rule’ comes from Tongdong Bai, author of *Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case* (2019) which lists four problems with the institution of one person, one vote.

15 Vanessa A. Boese, Staffan I. Lindberg & Anna Lührmann. 2021 Waves of autocratization and Democratization: a rejoinder. *Democratization*.

According to Bai, liberal, one-one and majority rule democracy tends to encourage an anti-establishment and obscurantist sentiment. Second, it gives the decision-power only to the present living voters of a state, leaving the issues concerning foreigners and future generations, such as deficit and environmental issues, at the mercy of these voters. Third, among all voters, the majority and the loudest voices tend to suppress the silenced minority interests. Fourth, the voters who can make their voices heard may be nevertheless incompetent at making rational decisions for their short-term self-interests. Thus, according to Bai, two fundamental features of modern societies are key in creating such 'irrational voters' phenomena: first, the modern states tend to be too large and populous for the masses to understand which policy is in their best interests, and second, the average people are too busy with making a living and pursuing whatever they like to do to think rationally about political matters beyond their immediate surroundings. Instead, Bai proposes what he calls 'political meritocracy,' which is "the idea that the political system should aim to select and promote public officials with above average ability and virtue by such means as examinations and performance evaluations at lower levels of government." This conceptualization changes the electoral democracy to selection of experienced and competent leaders at the top (national level), which he further thinks is best suited at the local level. Daniel Bell further refined the notion of political meritocracy, which he calls "the China model."¹⁶ However, the skepticism of the rationality of mass voters goes back to Plato and his "The Republic," which delivered a damning critique of democracy that renders it conducive to mass ignorance, hysteria, and ultimately, tyranny.

The political meritocracy, or Chinese styled democracy literature addresses argues that a rise of populist leaders and right-wing parties through democratic elections only leads to undemocratic electoral risks. However, the notion of political meritocracy may also offer enrichments, not replacements or dilutions of freedoms, especially in 'democracy for the people', if not 'by the people'. If, for instance, the Chinese look inward and find political resources in Confucian values, African societies could do the same and draw on indigenous forms of leadership which are also largely based on meritocracy. This model also draws our attention to understanding democracy in substantive (i.e., the delivery dimension) rather than merely procedural (i.e., the intrinsic value of political liberties) terms. State delivery in meeting the basic needs of citizens further generates legitimacy for governments that otherwise might not be democratic in the literal sense of the term, evidenced by their high popular rating. However, construing a binary be-

¹⁶ Daniel Bell. *The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)

tween political meritocracy and (Western) democracy is not warranted. After all, meritocracy is among the political phenomena and orientations found in modern democratic systems. If we imagine democracy properly, it is a system that combines political freedom with selecting meritorious leadership, which of course operates mainly through the bureaucracy because one of the most important things in democratic systems is the distinction between the government and the administration. Where the government is based on popular consent, the bureaucracy is a government founded on meritocracy. However, at its best, a democratic system delivers both freedom and meritocracy, even if the meritocratic element is mainly around the implementation aspect, rather than around policymaking, for example, which depends on political freedom.

In her 2009 book, *Dead Aid*, prominent Zambian-born economist Dambisa Moyo argued that “what poor countries at the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a multi-party democracy, but a decisive benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving.” She further proclaimed that “democracy can hamper development as democratic regimes find it difficult to push through economically beneficial legislation amid rival parties and jockeying interests.” Disillusionment with electoral democracy because of delivery deficit and its appropriation by autocrats has also pushed some scholars to promote benevolent dictatorship as an alternative, meaning, “a government in which an authoritarian leader exercises absolute political power over the state, but is perceived to do so with a regard for benefit of the population as a whole,” in a meritorious way, “standing in contrast to the decidedly malevolent stereotype of a dictator who focuses on their supporters and their self-interests.”¹⁷ A benevolent dictator may allow for some civil liberties or democratic decision-making to exist, such as through public referendums or elected representatives with limited power, and make preparations for a transition to genuine democracy during or after their term. This leadership style is also characterized by a commitment to economic development and stability as well as social progress, often achieved through effective administration and anti-corruption policies. Benevolent dictatorship has thus been promoted by some academic and policy circles as an alternative to liberal democracy, especially in the Global South where the basic conditions of democracy are lacking economic development and political stability in contexts of deep social division.

President Kagame is often considered a paradigmatic case of a benevolent dictator who helped transform the post-genocide Rwandan society into a stable and

17 <http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/240584>

effective government. Rwanda under Kagame witnessed political stability, remarkable economic growth, and a commitment to education, infrastructure, and gender equality. For these reasons and reinforced by official narratives of success built in various domains of political and social life, Kagame and the ruling RPF have a high popular rating, apparently considered by many Rwandese as legitimate.¹⁸ Of course, this governance has come at the cost of freedom as dissent is not tolerated by the Kagame regime. A benevolent dictatorship is known to bring about rapid change and development at the expense of individual freedoms and human rights. In contrast, democracy may be slow and messy, but it provides accountability, safeguards human rights, and ensures the inclusion of diverse voices in decision-making. The assessment of the relative merits and benefits of each governance model depends on the values, priorities, and context of the individuals and societies involved. This raises the fundamental question of what people want and which form of government they prefer. In general, what makes sense for people in their concrete situation? Answering these questions require public opinion surveys, which are very difficult to undertake in most countries with democratic deficits. Afrobarometer's latest opinion poll (2021)¹⁹ in 34 African countries revealed that "for the most part, Africans remain committed to democracy," and, "despite the many efforts to undermine democratic norms and freedoms, citizens continue to adhere to them." Those surveyed further had concrete ideas about what they mean by democracy: "The military should stay out of politics, political parties should freely compete for power, elections are an imperfect but essential tool for choosing their leaders, and it is time for the old men who cling to power to step aside."²⁰ Notably, four GHOA countries were included in the opinion survey, including Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.

On the other hand, the decline of democracy after the third wave has also generated the discourse of 'democratic recession' and 'democracy in crisis.' Lending credence to discussions of decline democracy are the affects in so-called mature democracies of Western countries where populism and right-wing movements came to power through democratic elections by what Bai calls 'irrational voters,' as the erratic Trump presidency in the White House indicated. This has raised the question of whether democracy is doomed, hence the search for alternative models of political order. Democracy scholars have struck back. In her widely acclaimed book, *Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First*

18 Denise Bentrovato. Rwanda, Twenty Years on Assessing the RPF's Legacy through the Views of the Great Lakes Region's New Generation. *Cahiers d'études africaines* 218 | 2015

19 <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/PP85-PAP20-Africans-want-more-democracy-but-leaders-arent-listening>

20 *ibid*

Century, Helene Landemore (2020) argued that what is viewed as a “crisis of democracy” is a sign of democracy’s vitality. Accordingly, Brexit and Trumpism are, in reality, the products of widespread resentment and distrust of political personnel and institutions that are failing to deliver the promise of democracy. In other words, what is rejected is not democracy per se but rather an elitist political system that is failing to protect the power of the people. She further argues that the problem today is not democracy in itself but rather the existing paradigm of democracy, which is too elitist and is incapable of fulfilling the democratic expectations of the people. She proposes a return to direct democracy via reform based on a set of five institutional principles: participatory rights, deliberation, majority rule, democratic representation, and transparency. This requires new deliberative spaces which Landemore calls the open mini-public, being a large randomly selected body of citizens gathered for agenda-setting, general law-making, or topical issues connected to the larger public through various mechanisms.

1.5 Revisiting the Debate on Democracy in Africa and the Horn Region

The first wave of Democratization came to the African continent in the 1960s during the early years of the Independence Era. Which type of democracy to adopt in Africa was debated in the immediate postcolonial period. Thought leaders, such as Caribbean Sir Arthur Lewis, rejected the relevance of the Anglo-American variant of democracy which is based on a zero-sum contest for representation and patronage in which the electoral victor wins sole control over the government and takes all the political spoils and distributive benefits available in the polity.²¹ Instead, he proposed a consociational model of democracy in the early 1960s, well ahead of the model being identified by Western scholars such as Lipjhart. As discussed in the previous section, consociational democracy is founded on a deliberate formula that averts the winner-takes-all implications of political competition by substituting a more predictable process for the acquisition of a guaranteed share of parliamentary and cabinet positions, government jobs, budget allocations, and access to decision-making. Whereas Anglo-American democracy unleashes unrestrained competition for the values of society with no promise of sharing with defeated adversaries, consociational democracy attempts to constrain competition limiting access to values by principles of proportional equity and sharing.

To many analysts of the then “Third World,” cultural pluralism was the most salient feature of the post-colonial state where political competition tended to be built on exclusively sectional parties that viewed the contest in absolute quasi-military win-loss terms. Almost invariably, this resulted in instability and dis-

21 *Arthur Lewis. 1965. Politics in West Africa.*

unity, leading to one-party systems and military intervention. Hence, it is argued that the consociational formula for power-sharing is most effective at maintaining unity, stability, and some measure of democracy. Lewis pointed out that there is a danger of importing the Western majoritarian democracy into Africa, but the debate was lost when the new postcolonial leaders who were confident of winning a majoritarian election came to power through a broad popular mandate. Their entrenched sense of entitlement was displayed in the popular name, “the liberators,” which was imbued with a sense of mission fueling sentiments of that building a new nation was their responsibility. Hence, postcolonial leaders such as Nyerere have advanced one-party government:

Some of us have been over-ready to swallow unquestioningly the proposition that you cannot have a democracy unless you have a second party to oppose the party in power. But, however difficult our friends in Britain and America may find it to accept what to them is a new idea that democracy can exist where there is no formal opposition, we in Africa should think very carefully before we abandon our traditional attitude²².

What Nyerere meant by ‘our tradition’ was the more consensus-based grassroots deliberations under the palaver tree “talking until you agree.” However, although he is most remembered among Tanzanians as a nation-builder, he was also a dictator imposing ill-suited ideologies such as villagization.

The second wave of democracy in Africa came in the 1990s, when policymakers uncritically recommended ‘Democratization’ in the majority rule sense of the term. Focus was on opening access to power through electoral democracy. However, the exercise of power was not given the attention it deserved. Six countries in the GHoA, as elsewhere in Africa, adopted the FPTP electoral system. The exceptions were Eritrea and South Sudan, countries that only had elections during independence, respectively, in 1993 and 2011. The FPTP has been adopted in other countries despite being deeply divided societies along ethnicity, religion, and region, as well as having strong power asymmetry between state and societal forces. Ruling parties, from Kanu in Kenya (1963–2002), EPRDF in Ethiopia (1991–2018), NRM in Uganda (since 1986), NCP in Sudan (1999–2019), to UMP in Djibouti (since 2003) all had “landslide” electoral victories. However, majoritarian democracy has not been delivered after three decades; hence the need to revisit the old debate on which form of government is a better fit in Africa and the specific country contexts GHoA region. Democracy should be translated into the specific African context, taking into account the unique challenges it faces. One of these challenges

22 Julius Nyerere. One-Party Government. *Transition*, No. 75/76, The Anniversary Issue: Selections from Transition, 1961-1976

is state formation in the institutional sense of the term. Upon independence, the state—in the bureaucratic sense of the term—was not there. What the postcolonial governments inherited was largely the coercive apparatus of the colonial state. Even Ethiopia with a long history of statehood, the state in the institutional sense of the term is still very weak, though state actors wield substantial power. State building was started in earnest by emperor Haile Selassie in the post-liberation period, but it was the Derg that built the state. This means whoever wins must build the state in their image.

Thus, unsurprisingly, most public debate and disagreement in Africa are on what Adem Kasse calls “pre-democracy issues” (e.g., among Ethiopians what Ethiopia is and what its national symbols are, the structure of administration, etc.).²³ Democratic countries in the West also differ in the type of democracy they have adopted based on their specific historical experiences and the critical issues that underpinned what Rustow called the social struggle. The nature of electoral competition in the UK, US, and across continental Europe, on the other, are distinct in some ways. In the US, for instance, it is winners take all more than in continental Europe.²⁴ Losing or winning means a lot in the US, but very little in continental Europe. It is this Anglo-American electoral system that has been adopted by African countries. As Adem noted:

Winner-takes-all might work in liberal democracies but not in non-democracies with a mere electoral façade. So, whoever is in power takes everything, but they are not democratic. And that is what makes the problems even more complicated. But as we think about a democratic way forward, it is indeed important to create a system where power does not become extremely concentrated in whoever wins it. Consociational democracy might be a better fit, but country contexts need to be taken seriously. It may be relevant or useful in one country, but not relevant in another country. What is very critical is, I think, enabling a conversation, a serious conversation, about the character of the democratic framework that each country must have. But one thing must be clear: In the electoral process, it's very important to make sure that whatever comes out of it does not become winner-takes-all. Because if it does become winner-takes-all, it's very likely to generate conflict.²⁵

The message that countries in the GHoA region and beyond should eschew win-

23 Adem Kasse, Senior Adviser, IDEA - Constitution-Building Processes, Interview on December 18, 2023.

24 See for instance Lijphart, Arend. “Power-Sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet Formation in Twenty Democracies.” *Government and Opposition*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1981

25 Adem, interview

ner-takes-all should be avoided even under a democratic election; even if the election is fair and free, when the party that wins takes a lot, the stakes of losing are too high to maintain democracy. Importantly, the European historical experience tells us that democracy came after the rule of law and the administration had been put in place. This means the administrative arms were not part of the political. The political competition in the West is about devising policy and overseeing the administrative structure. In Africa, and the Global South more broadly, political competition is not only about policy but also controlling/capturing the administrative structure which is why when leaders move around a lot happens, including the creation of lots of winners and losers, capacity to control the procurement, etc. Thus, competition is not about competing for ideas but rather fighting over state-mediated resources. As convincingly argued by Adem, there is a need to change how election is translated into political power in Africa. An election should not be conceived in terms of those who win getting everything they want but rather all participants receiving something (e.g., representation, power, resources, etc.) based on the electoral gains (e.g., number of votes or seats). The executive or cabinet offices should also be inclusive, and the bureaucracy autonomous/decentralized.²⁶

In the specific context of the GHoA region, there seems to be no alternative to democratic dispensation than society that eschews majority rule. The alternatives such as benevolent dictatorship are non-starters. For one thing, Rwanda's success story which invoked more than 20 countries that tried the authoritarian path, caused damage statistically such that those that have worked are exceptions. Whether benevolent dictatorship works is decidedly secondary, after the fact of election and dictatorship. After all, Kagame became a benevolent dictator in 2000, after the election and when he started to deliver. Otherwise, how do we know whether a leader would evolve into a benevolent dictator? How do we find them, and select them? It is impossible. The Horn cannot replicate Kagame.

A regional expert takes poignant issue with benign dictatorship autocratic rule as an alternative to democratic governance based on its miserable empirical record:

I think democracy is desirable and feasible in the Horn, as elsewhere. In this part of the world, the authoritarian model has simply not worked. You can go from Said Bare to Mengistu to Haile Selassie to Isayas and Museveni. It is the same story. In principle, you find the benevolent dictator, but this region does not have them and even in cases such as Kagame let us see where Rwanda goes - whether

26 Interview on December 28, 2023.

its success outlives him. That would be a real test of an authoritarian experiment. Can it reproduce its success once a particular leader has left the scene? Was this not the challenge for Ethiopia? EPRDF brought an economic miracle, but we know what happened after Meles died. On the other hand, the democratic preposition has never been tested in this region. Where did we have a genuine democratic experiment, perhaps except Kenya? We never really gave it a chance. Maybe Somalia during the period of parliamentary democracy but short-circuited very quickly. Ethiopia never really had the experiment unless political liberalization in the early days of reform which was also short-circuited. We know the Eritrean case. Sudan had episodes of democratic experiment but no more than three or four years of increments and then the military would overthrow elected leaders²⁷

Thus, the main question is not whether Africa, the Horn included, needs democracy or not but rather a thorough understanding of democratic impediments and how to make free and fair governance work under specific contexts. There is a strong need to change course from the specific type of democracy that Africa inherited from the West, which is majoritarian democracy. This type of democracy is not suitable for Africa because the incumbent is so powerful, and it does not operate within the necessary systems of constraints with checks and balances for countervailing forces. There is a felt need to create a regional deliberative space among intellectuals to propose a democracy that fits better according to institutional correlates. As it stands, the kind of democracy that is being exercised has become part of the problem.

27 Interview with a leading academic on the Horn of Africa region, December 21, 2023.

2. The Regional Context

2.1 The Pervasiveness of Conflict in the Greater HoA

Conflict has long been the hallmark of the Horn's political landscape. It is a region distinguished from the rest of the continent by the exceptionally high incidence of political conflict experienced since decolonization at both the interstate and intrastate levels. Also distinct from the rest of Africa, the region has seen the appearance of two new *de jure* independent states, Eritrea and South Sudan, through protracted civil wars, one *de facto* independent state, Somaliland, several regions under the control of insurgent movements, and large areas that are only nominally under the control of central governments. Civil war and political instability in Somalia since 1991 have featured as a classic example of state collapse whereas the newest nation in the world, South Sudan, impatiently plunged into deadly civil war barely more than two years after its existence as an independent country. Ethiopia, the only country to escape colonialism, has nevertheless struggled to re-fashion a post-imperial polity acceptable to the diverse communities the country represents, generating perhaps the highest number of liberation movements on the continent and suffering one of the bloodiest of civil wars in Africa during the two years of the Tigray War.

The latest country to jump over the conflict hurdle is Sudan which, despite an auspicious pro-democracy movement, toppled one of the longest autocratic rules in the continent only to find itself in a deadly confrontation within the ranks of its military, pushing the country to the verge of collapse. The two countries that have attained relative political stability are Eritrea and Uganda, though at a heavy cost of relentless if resilient, autocratic rule. Further, although most of the conflicts in the region are domestic, the region has also seen inter-state fighting, especially border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti, and the maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia. The latest diplomatic tension has been between Ethiopia and Somalia on issues related to the MoU between Addis and Hargeissa signed on January 1, 2024, according to which Somaliland will lease its coastland for commercial and military use in return for Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign country. This tension threatens to destabilize the whole region, as the emerging political alliance between Mogadishu, Asmara and Cairo meant to encircle Addis indicates, also with implications for domestic instability. These domestic and inter-state conflicts are intertwined making the GHoA one of a notable regional security complex case as conflict in one country often has a regional spillover.

2.2 Status and Ranking of the Horn Across Democratic Indices

A strong democratic deficit in the governance systems of GHoA countries is at the heart of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. While authoritarianism has been tried and utterly failed, the democratic project has barely started in the region. Nor has the Rwandan variant of benevolent dictatorship bore fruit. Liberation movements have degenerated into the worst forms of authoritarianism in Uganda and Eritrea whereas Ethiopia's version of benevolent dictatorship has proven to be unsustainable post-Meles developments. It is no wonder that the GHoA region lags way behind in democratic indices continentally, perhaps next only to the Central African region, as the following democracy, rule of law, and corruption indices illustrate in Tables 1–3.

Table 1. *Democracy Indices of the Horn—Freedom House reports, 2022/2023*

| Country | Political rights/40 | Civil liberties/60 | Total/100% | | Rank |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------|------|------|
| | | | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Kenya | 24 | 30 | 52 | 48 | 1 |
| Smaliland | 18 | 26 | 49 | 44 | 2 |
| Uganda | 11 | 24 | 35 | 34 | 3 |
| Djibouti | 5 | 19 | 24 | 24 | 4 |
| Ethiopia | 10 | 11 | 21 | 23 | 5 |
| Sudnan | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 6 |
| Eritria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 7 |
| South Sudnan | -3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8 |

Kenya has come a long way from its long tenure in a *de facto* one-party state under Kenyatta and Moi who instituted a *de jure* one-party state from 1982–2022. Multiparty democracy in Kenya ushered in the 2002 democratic election when the opposition defeated KANU's long reign since independence in 1963. Ever since Kenya has gone through democratic transformation, successfully carrying out competitive elections; however, most of these were accompanied by electoral violence.²⁸ Kenya holds regular multiparty elections, yet pervasive corruption and brutality by security forces remain serious problems. The country's media and civil society sectors are vibrant, even as journalists and human rights defenders remain vulnerable to restrictive laws and intimidation. According to

28 Karuti Kanyinga. Kenya Democracy and Political Participation. Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), March 2014.

IDEA's 2023 State of Democracy in Africa report²⁹, Kenya showed the most notable improvement in the representation rankings.

Table 2. Overall Governance Scores of Greater Horn Countries, 2017

| Country | Total Score/100 | Rank/54 | Trend(2008-2017) |
|--------------------|-----------------|---------|------------------|
| Kenya | 59.8 | 11 | +6.1 |
| Uganda | 55 | 20 | +1.4 |
| Ethiopia | 46.5 | 35 | +2.6 |
| Djibouti | 45.1 | 38 | +0.8 |
| Sudan | 30.8 | 49 | +1.4 |
| Eritrea | 29.3 | 51 | -2.9 |
| South Sudan | 19.3 | 53 | -9.3 |
| Somalia | 13.6 | 54 | +6.0 |

Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance Summary, October 2018. www.tralac.org/documents/resources/africa/2363-2018-ibrahim-index-of-african-governance-index-report/file.htm

Table 3. Corruption Perception Index

| Country | Score(100%) | Rank in the World (180 countries) |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|
| Ethiopia | 37 | 98 |
| Kenya | 31 | 126 |
| Djibouti | 30 | 130 |
| Uganda | 26 | 141 |
| Eretria | 21 | 161 |
| Sudan | 20 | 162 |
| South Sudan | 13 | 177 |
| Somalia | 11 | 180 |

Source: Compiled from Transparency International for Horn of Africa countries.

Kenya is also ranked as one of the 50 top performers in participation or civics and human rights ranking, as well as leading the region in domestic countervailing institutions to limit the power of the executive government, especially the courts, and maintaining electoral integrity (e.g., their role in the 2022 electoral dispute

29 IDEA. The State of Democracy in Africa, <https://www.idea.int/gsod/2023/chapters/africa/>

litigation and maintaining electoral integrity more broadly). Kenyans sued the executive on the dispute over the unpopular housing levy. The government suffered a major setback in November 2023, however, when a High Court in Nairobi declared a housing levy Ruto introduced unconstitutional. According to the judges, the plan to raise taxes to construct affordable homes was unconstitutional and discriminatory, a declaration that angered the executive. This is the rule of law at its best, nowhere to be seen elsewhere in the region; an exceptional Horn story that other countries can take inspiration from and emulate. Somaliland follows Kenya in democratic indices. It has managed to carry out successive presidential and parliamentary elections that enabled peaceful transfer of power. The uniquely home-grown negotiated political settlement of the 1990s among Somali National Movement SNM and other societal forces, particularly clan authorities, business groups, and religious leaders, smoothed the political transition from being part of Somalia to a self-declared independent state, also called a hybrid democracy. The *de facto* Somaliland state is the only in the GHoA region that substantially integrated the formal and informal traditional modes of governance and state structures. The role of traditional leaders in the state-formation stage led to the institutionalization of the 'Guurti' clan elders, hence the name of the upper house (the House of Elders) is also called Guurti. The Guurti are selected by clans, while the lower house, the House of Representatives, is popularly elected. This remarkable and novel democratic experiment is despite the formidable challenge the country has faced from lack of international recognition. Somaliland has existed as a *de facto* state without access to international financial organizations, however, under President Muse Bihi a turn to autocracy and consistent erosion of political rights and civic space has occurred. Journalists and public figures face pressure from authorities, minority clans are subject to political and economic marginalization, and violence against women remains a serious problem.

The Museveni government has long been considered a 'hybrid regime' of a different sort, at the crossroads between 'Democratization and authoritarianism.' Both in academic and policy circles, economic and political governance in the Museveni regime has been viewed as a 'two-level game' with authoritarian tendencies on the one hand—corruption, violence, and a narrowing political space—and efforts for political and economic liberalization on the other, including a free press, active civil society, and macro-economic reforms. This is the reason why Uganda has been ranked the third in democratic indices of various organizations. It has been ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President Yoweri Museveni since 1986. The regime has increasingly turned to autocratic rule in recent years while facing a strong electoral challenge by the opposition. The NRM retains power through patronage, in-

timidation, and politicized prosecutions of opposition leaders. Uganda's civil society and media sectors face legal and extralegal harassment and state violence. As in Eritrea, autocratic rule is so entrenched in Uganda that political transition is fraught with danger. A commentary by a CSO practitioner aptly captures the subdued public mood and sense of hopelessness in imagining a post-Museveni Uganda and the challenges of political succession:

On the one hand, young politicians such as Bobi Wine are offering an alternative vision for the country. But the question is whether the country will be safer under Bobi Wine or anyone outside of the establishment. The answer is no because government institutions have been converted into a security state. Anyone with a civilian mindset will have challenges governing Uganda. We are not ready for a civilian government to take over.

Djibouti was long governed as a single-party state, ending when a new constitution introducing multiparty politics was promulgated in 1992. Djibouti has been ruled by a powerful President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, who has been in office since 1999 and is not subject to term limits. While Djibouti technically has a multiparty political system, the ruling Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP) uses authoritarian means to maintain its dominant position. The opposition's ability to operate is severely constrained, and journalists and activists who air criticism of Guelleh or the UMP are regularly harassed or arrested. There has also been ethnic tension between the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Issa Somalis and the Afar. Djibouti's political class and the business interest connected to it has been dominated by the Issa Somalis.

Ethiopia is still struggling to be a post-imperial state with two revolutions and major political reform over the last 50 years. The 1974 Revolution led to a military dictatorship, for instance, whereas the 1991 revolution led to a party dictatorship under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). EPRDF's two grand projects—ethnic federalism and the developmental state—have some democratic elements, though both were conceived as illiberal state making project. Drawing on its Marxist roots during its 17 years long armed struggle, EPRDF sought to institute an ethno-cultural justice, remaking the historically entrenched Ethiopian unitarist state. The developmental state also sought to deliver on socioeconomic rights conceived as essential components of a democratic project in countries where the level of deprivation would undermine the pursuit of liberal rights. Overall, EPRDF's conception of democracy was conceived within the framework of revolutionary democracy opposed to liberal democracy tenets. Ethiopia under the Abiy administration on the other had an auspicious begin-

ning with a wider popular mandate. Political reform in the early years of political change in 2018 led to political liberalization, but without leading to democratic transition. In fact, Ethiopia is currently at a critical juncture where survival may be guaranteed only through a comprehensive peace process and genuine national dialogue.

Somalia is still struggling to come out of the vicissitudes of state collapse across decades while battling the Al-Shabaab insurgency. However, it has made some gains in recent years, including creating a semblance of order and growing acceptance of the central government by the Federal Member States (FMSs). The negotiations between the Federal Government and FMSs, in most cases involving Puntland, have democratic elements. The debate surrounding Farmajo's overstaying his term and the degree of backlash in response to it is an indication of a democratic experiment. He tried to break this emerging governance and again received gigantic pushback against. In many ways, Farmajo lost the battle of public opinion and tried to win the 2022 election with coercive powers using money and the ability to pay or fund people to accept what he was doing; this also failed in some ways. The case in Somalia all the time is that nobody can assert a high enough level of coercive power to override the need to cooperate. The current conversations around fiscal federalism are a huge advancement from where conversations were when state rebuilding started in earnest in 2012.

Progress is also visible in the way district councils are being formed. Similarly, the cooperation between federal government forces and local militias is different from how it was six or seven years ago. The latter increasingly view the federal government as legitimate. This shows a growing level of understanding of different forms of cooperation, or iterative developments of governance. We also see real moves to make more inclusive processes and establish different judiciary practices. There are a lot of remarkable grassroots women's groups who are advocating for this as well as an open media environment that are being more widely supported in a place where to be a journalist means that one is putting their life on the line. This is creating a level of stability to move functional democracy forward.

Somalia planned to introduce a universal suffrage in 2024 replacing the indirect electoral system with one man, one vote, and Puntland conducted a peaceful election in January 2024.

Eritrea is a militarized authoritarian state that has not held a national election since independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), headed by President Isaias Afwerki, is the sole political party. Arbitrary detention is commonplace, and citizens are required to perform national service, often for their entire working lives. The government shut down all inde-

pendent media in 2001. Eritrea has indeed perfected an autocratic rule to the extent that even if there is suddenly a political will to open civic space, the entire political system would collapse, affecting not just the regime but the whole country. As a specialist on Eritrean politics and the Horn more broadly noted,

The challenge in Eritrea is 'hat there's no way to moderate a system that has gone so deep into totalitarianism like the semi-authoritarianism of Uganda where they can at least play in the middle ground. This is impossible for Isaias, given the nature of the system he's constructed. He gave Eritrean society radiation therapy, basically eradicating every and almost every element of dynamism in society.

Sudan and South Sudan on the other hand experimented with violent forms of kleptocracy whereas in Djibouti, and partly in Somaliland, unholy alliance between business and political elites resulted in an oligarchy. After a pro-democracy protest movement ousted the repressive regime of long-time President Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) in 2019, Sudan was ruled by a transitional government in which military and civilian leaders agreed to share power until national elections could be held. The government began to enact reforms, and space for the exercise of civil liberties slowly opened. However, the process was thrown into turmoil in late 2021 when the military dissolved the transitional government in a coup and suppressed the ensuing pro-democracy protests. Throughout the transition period, violence involving security forces, other armed groups, and rival ethnic communities has persisted in many parts of the country. The effect has been that the much-anticipated democratic transition in Sudan following the 2019 pro-democracy movement has not materialized. Worse, the ongoing civil war following the power struggle between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) has put the very survival of the Sudanese state at stake

South Sudan has failed to build consensus around more than half a century of struggle for independence, effecting democratic dispensation. The state is barely built to call it a 'failed state'. Barely two years into its existence as an independent country for which so much was sacrificed, a civil war began in 2013, when a rift between President Salva Kiir and the Vice President he dismissed, Riek Machar, triggered fighting among their ethnically divided supporters. Since a peace agreement was reached in 2018, elections have been delayed and elites have presided over an uneasy power-sharing arrangement. South Sudan suffers from rampant corruption and dire economic circumstances. Civilians, journalists, and aid workers have been targeted by the SPLM regime. South Sudan is gearing up for the first election ever since it has become independent without many of the provisions in the peace agreement such as a permanent constitution and unification of the security actors in place.

3. Critical challenges

3.1 Nation-Building Crisis

Rustow's 'single background condition' of national unity as a prerequisite for Democratization is conspicuously missing in the GHoA region. Building on Rustow's model, Mengisteab (2020) has further elaborated on this missing background condition in the GHoA regional context, as well as transitional African countries more broadly. First, argues Mengisteab, is "the fragmentation of societies along primordial ethnic and religious lines, as reflected by diversity management and nation-building crisis manifested in chronic state-identity conflicts." Second is a national unity problem of a different kind, i.e., "the fragmentation of economic and institutional systems, where citizens operate under parallel economic and institutional spaces." This relates to the distinctly organized state-sanctioned formal systems with relatively advanced capitalist schemes and the informal traditional systems largely based on a subsistence economy. The GHoA region is massively rural, which means that most people live under the informal traditional system but are increasingly encroached upon by the state system without functional integration. Mengisteab noted that,

...the different economic systems (sub-systems) are characterized by corresponding institutional systems with divergent property rights laws and resource allocation mechanisms; disparate decision-making systems; and distinct judicial systems and conflict-resolution practices (p. 16).

The fragmentation of economic and institutional systems has severely undermined meaningful democratic participation, as the bulk of the voting block (the rural majority) is largely excluded or whose participation is nominal at best.

Mismanagement of the region's diversity, evident in the nation state project, is one of the hallmarks of the Horn's political landscape. Central to this mismanagement has been the idea of building a nation through cultural homogenization and political centralization. This project was more advanced in Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopian emperors sought to build a nation through a linguistic and cultural imposition, and a similar project was implemented in Sudan through the imposition of the Arabic language and Islam. In both countries, so-called core groups were regarded as building blocks of the nation-building project; respectively the northern highlands and the Riverine areas of the

central region largely identified with the Arab groups of the Ja'alin, Sha'agiyya and Dangala. Processes of state formation both in imperial Ethiopia and post-colonial Sudan built around the core-periphery dyad generated ethnonationalist mobilisations in the periphery. However, in both cases, the centre is fragile and fraught with hegemonic rivalry creating different degrees of 'centerness.'

A similar political process is observable in other countries of the Horn, albeit in a more subtle form. In Djibouti, for instance, the nation is built around the hegemony of the Issa Somalis at the expense of the Afar who are marginalized in political representation and national wealth distribution, generating various resistance movements.

In South Sudan, nation-building is undermined by the Dinka elite's hegemonic aspirations and practices imposed on the country's deep diversity.

The historic fault line between North and South in Uganda, reinforced by British colonial rule, has informed the Lord Resistance Army's destructive wars feeding on the Acholi's sense of exclusion from the Ugandan nation.

Eritrea has followed a very different trajectory in nation-building. Echoing Charles Tilly's adage that war makes nations, and nations make war, three decades of liberation movements and the experience of war has generated a strong sense of Eritrean nationalism built around the pride of defeating one of the largest armies in Africa. Unlike other liberation movements, such as the SPLA, EPLF also proved to be exceptionally cohesive; however, it has rooted out internal dissent. Apprehensive of Ethiopia's experiment with ethnic federalism which is perceived as a direct threat to Eritrea's own diversity, the EPLF has relegated ethnicity to the cultural realm eschewing it no relevance in the political realm.

However, the demographically larger Tigrigna speakers of Eritrean highlands as a major group that made up the EPLF during the armed struggle are politically dominant, generating peripheral discontents such as among the Afar. In Somalia, long the envy of African countries for its cultural homogeneity both ethnically and religiously, competition over the Somali state is channeled to the clan level. Historically, the Hawiye clan has been politically dominant whereas the non-Somali groups of people, generically called the "Bantu" of southern Somalia, are not only politically excluded but also socially discriminated against. In Somaliland, the political dominance of the Isaq clan generated grievance especially among the Dhulbahante who are currently mounting unprecedented insurgency called SSC consisting of the Sool, Sanag and Cayn regions.

The crisis of nation-building in Kenya is closely related to a policy choice its early postcolonial leaders made, especially the (in)famous Sessional #10, entitled, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya" (1965). The following com-

mentary by a research participant sheds light on how Kenya's attempt to avoid the prevailing socialist trappings of the period and build a capitalist economy turned out to be counter-productive in nation-building:

The problem with nation-building in Kenya has been this singular focus on the economy. True, we have succeeded in building the strongest economy in the region, but this came at the cost of nation-building. Kenya and Tanzania very much diverged in their path. We succeeded in building the economy but not the nation. Tanzania succeeded in nation-building but not the economy. Tanzania has many more tribes than Kenya has. And yet Kenyans are more divided, and they identify along tribal lines. Part of the problem came from this foundational document called Session #10 which encouraged Kenyans to accumulate wealth, but we got stuck with it; this compelling feeling that one has to work hard for himself otherwise he would not likely succeed. Sure, this helped people become industrious, but it doesn't come easily because this acquisitive drive has also been inserted into tribal politics. Session paper #10 also made certain blunders. For example, it advocated for the concentration of resources in what was identified as productive areas so give money to areas that look productive and then we can have like a trickle-down effect. The logic was you produce money in these areas; the agriculturally productive ones, and the other areas then can benefit from that. But in effect, these areas that were not productive were marginalized and were cut off parts from national development. That is why those communities started isolating themselves and saying we are not part of Kenya.

The problem with nation-building in the Horn is not only the ethnic capture of the state or policy-conditioned regional inequality but also the failure of the states to generate a national pride based on practical accomplishments, be it an equitable utilization of natural resources (e.g., using the oil bonanza for socioeconomic transformation) or economic development. Countries such as Ethiopia have even missed the opportunity to generate shared historical narratives around unifying symbols such as the victory at the battle of Adwa. The ethnicization of the Adwa victory has degenerated into who has contributed how much, begging the question of what Ethiopians agree on if they fail to agree on Adwa?

The nation-building crisis has a direct bearing on the challenges of Democratization in the region. A wrong-headed nation-building project has meant the identity of the state is contested for lacking national consensus on the ba-

sics, politics being reduced to whether the state survives or not, and if so, how. An inclusive national identity framework and integrative practices are key for state stability, which is itself a condition for the democratic project to take root. Building a legitimate and stable state is a democratic imperative, a background condition as Rustow calls it. Democracy in deeply divided societies such as in the Horn also raises the question of what model of democracy better fits the regional and country-specific contexts. There are important democratic innovations for transforming conflicts and securing peace in “divided societies”—concordance, local representation, federalism, and cultural autonomy. The concordance model allows the representatives of all important groups to participate in the political decision-making process, especially in the executive. Local representation has been introduced in several deeply divided societies, but the systems differ by their “national character.” In the search for institutional designs aimed at transforming ethnic conflicts, federalist structures are largely regarded as the best institutional option.

Nowhere else than in the GHoA region is the identity of the state as hugely contested. While Ethiopia is still struggling with reinventing itself as a post-empire polity with a legitimate government and acceptable mechanisms of accommodating diversity, Sudan has fractured along the historically entrenched centre-periphery Faultline. In what appears to be a repeat of the integrative failures of Sudan, South Sudan has embarked on an exclusive nation-building project couched in the discourse of “Dinka domination of independent South Sudan.” It is the same in Djibouti where the political regime is not only oligarchic but also ethnically exclusive, as the domination of the state machinery by the Issa Somali at the expense of the Afar indicates. A similar process is observable in the Somalia complex, albeit at a clan level.

3.2 The Imbalance between State and Societal Forces

In Rustow’s dynamic model of democracy, a second key phase is what he calls the preparatory phase, i.e., the dynamic process of Democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle between state and societal forces. This preparatory phase is missing in the GHoA region, and the African continent more broadly because state actors would not allow the political space for the various non-state actors to negotiate their respective interests. Semir Yusuf, one of the leading scholars on democracy in the GHoA, has offered the most solid structural analysis for democratic blockage in the region. In his analysis, the Ethiopian context serves as a paradigmatic case and framework that could be adopted by other countries as well, at least the Sudan. Accordingly, a major impediment to Democratization in the Horn is the strong

power asymmetry between state and societal forces. Historically, democracy evolved in Europe and in the West more broadly not because of good intentions nor the existence of a democratic political culture during Democratization, as is often assumed. Instead, democracy evolved because state formation was accompanied by negotiation between state and societal forces that shifted a violent contestation into not only a peaceful dispute, but also effective negotiation that produced consensus over democratic rules of engagement. This form of state formation goes as far back as the 13th century, more emblematically played out in the Magna Carta (The Great Charter), which is considered a foundational document of Western democracy.

Magna Carta signifying limited power and rule of law laid the foundation for a democratic state when King John of England negotiated with the nobles and church leaders. The barons protested the tax demand of the King to fund his wars with France. Instead of violently overthrowing an autocratic king, which they could have done as they already controlled London, the English Barons instead negotiated for a new social contract that begot a democratic political order in the long term. In so doing, the Barons acted as a section of society whose self-interest was affected by an abusive king who endlessly demanded taxes to fund his wars rather than defending the interest of the general public or in their capacity as pro-democracy actors. However, their action had an unintended consequence: Subsequently, different sections of society have variously negotiated their rights with the state instead of expecting the state to benevolently issue rights.

In Africa, state formation was a colonial project with repressive tools that postcolonial African states inherited. Whatever democratic rights have come about are either very superficial or the consequence of presidents or prime ministers preserving a right to 'issue rights.' Even in Ethiopia, the only African country, which was not colonized, state formation was not accompanied by the necessary negotiation between state actors and societal forces. The state is so strong that it never negotiated with societal forces. As such, autocratic rule is not accidental but historically constituted in the Ethiopian case, at least since the mid-19th century when the emperors felt a strong urge to centralize power for a modernist project to ward off the looming danger from colonial encroachments in the region. According to Semir, the strong power of the state left societal forces with only two options to bring about political change: either protest or armed resistance. Whereas protest movements might have contributed to the replacement of one autocratic regime by another because of organizational feebleness for forming under the oppressive environment of autocratic rule, armed resistance mustered organizational capacity because they operate outside the preview of the over-

bearing state. However, liberation movements and the war associated with them create the same autocratic conditions that they transfer onto the state when they seize power, further bolstering the autocratic configuration of the state. This is the reason why nearly all former rebel organizations fail to transition to democratic rule. Once established, autocratic rule has a reinforcing loop, new state actors begin to rule drawing on the historically entrenched autocratic repertoire. Thus, another Horn country that comes close to Ethiopia in the historical construction of autocratic rule is the Sudan where the military has evolved as the major political institution. Not only is the military much stronger than civilian political forces but it also has a strong sense of entitlement to carrying out coups against civilian or coalition governments to 'guard the nation.'

Although Kenya has been hailed for its greater democratic credentials compared with other countries in the region, especially with a functional judiciary and a vibrant media and CSO sector, it too suffers from strong power asymmetry between 'political dynasties,' ordinary citizens, and new aspiring elites, called 'the hustlers' in Kenyan parlance. Two families connected to the iconic Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga serve as the faces of the Kenyan anti-colonial struggle. With the auspicious beginning with Kenyatta as President and Odinga as Vice President, it did not take long for the two families to part company and enter into adversarial politics often framed in ethnic terms. This has a long-term consequence: "What is unique about Kenya's political history is how personal competition morphed into an intergenerational fight. What arose from the rivalry were elections that at times felt more like dynastic successions than democratic elections of independent candidates ;" as the more intense rivalry between Uhuru Kenyatta and Reila Odinga has shown. The two families have amassed tremendous wealth and as such represent powerful economic elites, so much so that "democracy in Kenya is inextricably linked to these two families and what they came to represent." The polarization brought by this rivalry ultimately led to the deadly 2007 post-electoral violence that cost the lives of over a thousand people. The latest 2022 election appears to have heralded a new dawn in Kenyan politics with some shifts from tribal to class politics, in which the terms of the political competition were framed in the language of "hustlers versus dynasties," as the two families colluded to block access to power by William Ruto, who has a humbler background. This has "shifted the debate from ethnic to class-based politics setting up a face-off between the rich and poor," with Ruto assuming the affectionate popular title of "hustler-in-chief" President. It remains to be seen how far the shift from ethnic to class-based politics materializes with the much-needed equity in national wealth redistribution. After all, although he started with a humble background, Ruto is also one of the richest men in the country. For democratic norms and institutions to take root in the GHoA there is an urgent need to rebalance the power asymmetry between state and societal forces.

3.3 The Limits of Majoritarian Democracy

Autocracies in Africa first appeared in the third wave of Democratization in the 1990s when democratic politics attained a hegemonic status on a global scale. Reminiscent of the adage “if you cannot beat them, join them,” autocratic governments quickly learned that they could make use of democracy by adopting democratic façades, especially by holding regular elections. To ensure that they remain in power more or less unaffected, third wave governments opted for a majoritarian electoral system, as is the case in the Horn where all countries adopted the FPTP, winner-takes-all electoral system. As argued in the previous sections, this electoral system is a misfit in deeply divided societies, and more so where there is an explosive mix between a strong state with an ethnic capture that makes the stakes of losing very high as winners use state power to marginalize and punish communal contenders. Creative constitutional crafting and flexible institutional engineering, beyond a simple majoritarian system of democratic governance, are required to mediate and moderate conflict in these deeply divided societies. Experts often disagree over the design of institutional mechanisms that could stabilize these ethnically fragmented and often politically polarized societies. However, there is an emerging consensus that as a model of democracy, some form of *consociational governance* is good for the region if tailored to reflect the specificities of each country. This is because consociational democracy calms down the power contestation; no one would be left behind from the contest as major elites and identity groups are brought into the power block. From a normative point of view, as Semir noted, consociation also helps ensure justice through its various pillars of power sharing, proportional representation, segmental autonomy, and veto power. Marginalized groups feel they are included, which helps create a more just system and legitimate government.

But identifying consociational democracy as a model of democracy which fits the Horn’s context is one thing, and figuring how to implement it is another, very problematic task given the strong power asymmetry between state and societal forces, especially in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and partly in Kenya. The foundational premise is the state is very powerful vis a vis societal forces, with the exception of Somalia in the context of state collapse and reconstruction, and this begs the question of why a strong state should negotiate in the first place. Consociational democracy by its very nature is limiting, constraining, and powerful in which state actors are interested to negotiate unless forced to or become weaker. On the other hand, social forces are unable to institute a democratic political order; either they are very feeble as protest movements or armed struggles to change autocratic rulership, not a democratic order, as the experience of Ethiopia and the two Sudans are showing. If

the tested path of various forms of contestation has not worked, the challenge is proposing an alternative. Drawing on the works of Slater and Joseph Wong, Semir proposes an untrodden path—negotiation between state and societal forces through incentive structures.

The argument for such negotiation is that a state might also concede not only through contestation but also when it is incentivized, citing the example of East Asian Tigers which adopted Democratization after rapid economic development, creating a middle class and opening the political space when they learned that they would win an election based on the popular legitimacy they derived from authoring economic development. What these political incentives will be in the Horn depends on the specificity of each country. It could be a successful developmental state, as EPRDF tried in Ethiopia but failed to open the political space when it was still strong, or the Prosperity Party taking credit for opening the political space (e.g., a genuine national dialogue process out of which democratic rules of engagement could be generated)—a political capital that they can wisely spend in an electoral contest. Alternatively, armed groups put pressure on the state short of a violent overthrow but settle for a Magna Cartaesque moment for the Horn, with negotiation leading to a rebalance of the asymmetry between state and societal forces and a more consensus-based democracy.

3.4 The Resource Curse—the Horn’s Oily Kleptocracies

The Horn of Africa States is believed to have substantially exploitable and globally sought natural resources so much so that the region has been dubbed a new frontier in the exploration of hydrocarbons. The discovery of oil and other strategic resources, such as gold and copper, has created an emerging extractive sector in the Horn, and especially in the Sudan and South Sudan which discovered oil in the 1980s. Sudan has been an oil exporting country since 1999 and South Sudan since 2011 upon independence taking 75% of Sudan’s oil resource. Kenya has struck limited oil since 2012 in Turkana and started exporting in 2019. A more substantial oil is found in Uganda, since 2006, where oil production is expected to start by 2025 with a potential revenue of up to U.S. \$3 billion per year. Ethiopia and Somalia are at the exploration stage. Finally, in addition to oil, the discovery of significant gold in the GHoA region has further boosted the extractive sector, especially in the Sudan (e.g., the Jebel Amer gold mine in Darfur) and Eritrea (e.g., the Bisha gold and copper mine).

One would expect these globally sought strategic resources to stimulate economic development for a region with one of the lowest human development indicators and humanitarian crises in the world. The result, however, has been the opposite—

far from being a blessing, the high desire for these natural resources in the GHoA has followed the path of the proverbial resource curse, “a paradoxical situation in which a country underperforms economically, despite being home to valuable natural resources. [...] It is generally caused by too much of the country’s capital and labor force concentrated in just a few resource-dependent industries.” By failing to make adequate investments in other sectors, countries can become vulnerable to declines in commodity prices, leading to long-run economic underperformance.

The resource curse is also associated with negative governance outcomes, especially in countries where democratic institutions of accountability are not put in place before the discovery of the resource. Various studies have convincingly linked oil and authoritarianism. Lucas I. Gonzalez in his article, “Oil Rents and Patronage,” makes an important causal connection between large oil rent and the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian rule in which rentier governments spend oil money to expand their political machines through patronage and clientelism, to buy off political loyalties, and enlarge the repressive apparatus to suppress discontent.

For instance, as the South Sudanese case study indicates, the resource curse (oil rent) has rapidly turned the country into what Aled de Waal calls a political marketplace where politics is increasingly monetized. There is also lack of democratic incentives for the governing elites—no need for political investment through provision of social services and building an accountable government or constituency.

Oil gives dictatorships money to buy off their citizens, so they do not have to democratize, but this is not universally true. Norway and Canada are oil-rich countries, yet they have managed to escape the resource curse and instead successive governments have used the oil to fuel economic growth and ensure prosperity. Authoritarian governments tend to nationalize their oil industries, which gives them exclusive control over a resource the rest of the world desperately needs. This allows them to extract what economists call “rents,” or money that you get because you have control over a resource rather than because of anything that you do to or with said resource. The African Development Bank has also noted the nexus between oil and authoritarianism and how the latter puts a higher premium on hanging onto state power:

Oil wealth can be a political curse when oil-rich dictators oppose democratic development because they will have more to give up from losing power. In Africa, many of the poorest and most troubled states have, paradoxically, high levels of nat-

ural resource wealth. Most of these countries are oil producers and have become what the literature calls “rentier states...”

Thus, a great portion of their national wealth comes from the export of oil and a few political elites collect the revenues from the oil export and use the money for cementing their political, economic, and social power by controlling government and its bureaucracy. Understanding the effect of oil wealth and democracy is important. Democratic institutions provide a check on governmental power and thereby limit the potential of public officials to amass personal wealth and carry out unpopular policies.

It is the same with other extractive resources, for instance, Eritrea raised \$4–5B during the era of the Bisha mine from 2011–2015. Hence, as a specialist on Eritrean politics noted,

Basically, this means doubling its GDP. Eritrea has a tiny GDP, especially back then. Nobody has any idea where that money went. Nobody has any clue where this money was spent. It went to funding Isayas’s resilient autocracy through patronage networks, the main beneficiaries being the military elites.

The oil bonanza is also likely to make autocrats militaristic, as the experience of Sudan has shown so vividly when the first shipment of oil coincided with the massive importation of weapons. The result was the intensification of the civil war in South Sudan. In countries such as Uganda, the link between oil and autocracy is already visible before production begins. Museveni’s description of the discovery of oil as “my oil’ is a bad omen that sets the tone of what to expect from Uganda’s emerging extractive sector.

In Kenya, the resource curse is also associated with environmental concerns and increased conflict associated with an anticipated economy, both in the form of a spike in communal violence as well as between local communities and oil companies. Recognizing the potential for rent generation, particularly around licensing, politicians became increasingly active in the sector. This led to worsening outcomes in terms of state governance and capacity’, as Kenya’s oil institutions became the site of intra-elite contestations over rents.

3.5 Weak Countries, Weak Regional Entities

Starting in 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) widened its scope and mandate culminating into its transformation to IGAD in 1996. IGAD is therefore a young organization, addressing a widening regional agenda. In comparative terms, IGAD is one of the weakest of the RECs in

Africa. It is the relatively strongest in peace and security but focuses on mediation efforts among warring parties in countries such as Sudan (e.g., the CPA), the Revitalized Peace Agreement in South Sudan, etc. These mediation efforts are not anchored in a clear governance reform agenda, however, though there are some limited efforts such as establishing the regional Governance Forum, a platform for Human rights institutions, Youth and women forums, etc.

There are additional challenges weakening IGAD. For example, the crisis of statehood and political instability in the region. There are active conflicts in four of the eight countries: Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. Tension is brewing in Uganda on issues related to the blocked political transition by Museveni's longest autocratic rule, and authoritarianism in Eritrea might be resilient but also fragile, raising the specter of political instability in post-Isayas Eritrea. Even Kenya, the most democratic country in the region, has seen political instability related to electoral violence. Although there are some inter-state tensions, the major form of conflict in the region is domestic, most of which comes from governance problems. Unless these countries achieve a measure of political stability, thinking of a regional Democratization agenda will be farfetched. As such, democracy could only be born out of national processes such as genuine national dialogue to generate new social contracts. Furthermore, the findings of the political economy analysis of IGAD indicate that,

...tensions between IGAD's original aims, member state interests, donor reliance and continental objectives that encourage IGAD to 'look like a REC', to mirror comparable RECs in Africa. While adopting many of the institutional forms, in practice IGAD functions through ad hoc processes, with frequent, personalised involvement of Heads of State, and few systematic, institutionalised approaches to addressing regional common interests... [and] there is therefore also a tension between structural factors that support the logic of regional integration, and conflicts that undermine regional integration taking place in practice

The major culprit that sabotages economic and political integration in the region, preventing IGAD from emerging as a strong REC, are protracted conflicts, largely domestic but also inter-state tensions. The lack of a stable and prosperous country to serve as a regional hegemon in par with Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa in Southern Africa, and Egypt in Northern Africa is also a problem. Notably, Ethiopia comes close to being a regional GHoA hegemon geographically, economically, and demographically. Geographically, for instance, it is the only country bordering all other IGAD member states except Uganda, and in demographic size it is

the second most populous country in the continent with over 120 million people, which is more than the combined populations of all the other countries in the region. With rapid economic growth, its status as a landlocked country and huge potential for energy resource could also drive the agenda of regional integration, while the protections connected to that and its regional preference for bilateralism rather than multilateralism has also undermined what IGAD could and could not do. That the region is politically unstable has also meant a regional vacuum to champion the Democratization agenda and democratic spillovers across borders. Unstable and weak countries have created a very weak REC whose very existence is dependent on donor support. The following commentaries by IGAD personnel reflect on the challenges facing IGAD in the following manner:

An entity that is 90 % donor-dependent is not able to drive a strategic agenda such as contributing to the stability of the countries in the region so they can embark on Democratization. You get a return when you invest in it. Member States invest in IGAD so limited to the function of the Secretariat. We are so dependent on donor funds to implement activities for which platforms have already been built, such as the Governance Forum. However, such initiatives are neither reliable nor sustainable. There should be a degree of ownership of IGAD by Member States for it to be viable. The problem is not about the mandate. Like other RECs, IGAD could also champion inclusive governance, but the question remains, without the political will of the Member States to strengthen it most of the planned activities will remain either as declarations of intent or waiting for the benevolence of the donors. Sadly, Member States are not even timely paying their membership fees. If you have incompatible interests, you cannot build a common house. That is what is like in IGAD. A major indicator of this is how vested they are. The countries are sticking to their respective national interests and prefer bilateral engagements.

The regional and continental entities are too weak to entrench democratic norms in the region. Countries in the region are beset with protracted domestic conflicts caused by autocratic rule and the nation-building crisis. There is also a divided loyalty. Kenya is more interested in the EAC than in IGAD which it considers as Ethiopia's backyard. Half of the countries in the GHoA region—Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan—are not members of EAC and Somalia has joined only recently. This has created a divided loyalty with an unofficial division of labor where in IGAD does peace and security and EAC trade. Additionally, EAC is much more advanced in endorsing democratic norms and building regional democratic insti-

tutions, evident for instance in the regional parliament and the East African Court of Justice.

The main problem for weak regional entities is the region's entrenched autocracies. Genuine integration needs democracy or at least requires legitimate governments. Normally, it is democracies that have international commitments. Dictators do not want to cede power downwards to the people and upwards to supra-national organizations. EAC has a better prospect of supporting Democratization in the region. The challenge for EAC is that it contains relatively more democratic countries such as Kenya, and entrenched autocracies such as Uganda and Rwanda. For economic integration to succeed there must be a modicum of rule of law. There is a need to believe in the institutions of member countries, so, even if EAC's raison d'être is economic integration, this could not be fully realized without democracy and the rule of law. A division of labor through a memorandum of understanding between IGAD and EAC, respectively specializing on peace, security, and trade could also help not only meet these objectives but also push for a governance reform agenda in the wider East Africa region.

AU has a comprehensive mandate that encompasses the establishment, maintenance, and advancement of democracy within its Member States. Since 2000, the AU has continuously expanded its mission to promote democracy on the continent, introducing innovative measures to combat unconstitutional regime changes and foster the growth of democratic institutions. The AU has a broader mandate to promote democracy continuously on its own and through the RECs. Agenda 2063 envisions a continent in which there is a universal culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. The Department of Political Affairs is responsible for promoting, facilitating, coordinating and encouraging democratic principles and the rule of law, including respect for human rights, participation of civil society in the development process of the continent, and the achievement of durable solutions for addressing humanitarian crises. The department also coordinates the implementation of the African Governance Architecture as well as implements sustainable solutions to humanitarian and political crises, including preventive diplomacy. The AU has also established the African Union High-Level Panel on Emerging Technologies (APET), cognizant of the potential significance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the facilitation of free and fair elections across Africa. However, the AU's self-understanding as a norm-setting institution and potential arbiter for championing the democratic agenda continentally is limited by its intergovernmental institutional character and the inter-play between the norms of

democratic governance and 'elections as sovereign process' among the member states:

...the tendency is for the AU to choose to posture around securing momentary peace. This has undermined democratic consolidation and progress on the continent, despite the significant investment which the AU has made in electoral and democratic governance institutions and processes in the past two decades

Consequently, contested electoral outcomes, as in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, popular revolts, as in Ethiopia and Sudan, and the resurgence of unconstitutional extension of term limits, as in Djibouti and Uganda, continue to take place in Africa.

3.6 Strong External Interference

The GHoA is an extremely important region and, therefore, attracts both friends and foes. It straddles an extremely important geographic space that overlooks the Red Sea (occupying its western shores), the Bab El Mandab (the choking point where the Indian Ocean seamlessly joins the Red Sea), the Gulf of Aden, and the northeastern Indian Ocean. This is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world where ships transporting not only normal goods but also tankers transporting oil and gas to Europe and the Americas from West Asia ply via the Suez Canal. The Horn's geostrategic importance is also because of its proximity to the Middle East and all the geopolitical volatility connected to that. The region is also the source of the Blue Nile, which provides water to Sudan and Egypt, and from which Ethiopia is increasingly pushing for equitable utilization. For these reasons, more than any other part of Africa, the GHoA region has seen greater and more intense external interference. All major global powers have vied to have a foothold in it, significantly affecting domestic politics and development. The region was a major contested space throughout the Cold War; a prime security area for the West's so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with the rise of political Islam first in the Sudan and then in Somalia, and in recent years, a major site where the hegemonic rivalry of the Gulf States has played out.

Countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya have been considered by the US as key security partners in the wake of 9/11. The preoccupation with security has led to the securitization of development aid, increasingly sidelining democracy, and human rights agendas. This was a god-sent opportunity for autocratic governments in the region to gain international legitimacy as well as the much-needed development aid especially by govern-

ments in Ethiopia and Uganda where they instrumentalized their geopolitical appeal to shield their democratic deficits and poor human rights records. They also secured tremendous development aid which was strategically used to maintain autocratic rule with a modicum of political stability. Despite the authoritarian nature of the governments they engage with,

...western enthusiasm for supporting, training and arming the military and security services of these states has grown unabated. As a consequence, illiberal states are emerging and growing stronger in Africa, supported by securitization and the enthusiasm of western governments to put security above all else.

Over the past two decades or so, China has emerged as a credible partner of Africa in terms of investment and finance, technology, entrepreneurship, trade and reciprocal access to national markets, and capacity building support. The GHoA region is part of China's grand scheme of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), evident in flagship projects of China-Africa cooperation such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and Mombasa-Nairobi Railway. China has become the biggest bilateral lender for countries in the Horn. In Ethiopia, for instance, 50% of its \$28B external loan came from China. Impressed by China's remarkable non-democratic route in economic development, governments in the Horn have found a new reference point to justify autocratic practices in the name of 'development.' This growing Chinese presence in the region has also raised the West's eyebrows, further goading them to invest more in geostrategic calculations rather than support democratic projects. Thus, the Horn is drawn into the hegemonic rivalry between China and the US: Both countries established military bases in Djibouti, opening the gate for a more intense competition to establish military bases in the region by other countries. Currently, Djibouti has one of the highest concentrations of military bases, from eight countries. Its autocratic government has largely lived on this geopolitical rent to fund patronage networks.

In recent years, the biggest external interference in the Horn has come from Gulf countries. This is expressed in various ways. First, are hegemonic struggles starting with the tension between Qatar and Iran on the one hand, and the Saudi/UAE alliance on the other for issues related to political Islam which Qatar support. Lured by financial inducements, both camps had willing clients which in turn allowed the countries to interfere in domestic politics. Somalia and Sudan are the most affected countries in this regard. The Yemen war between the Iran-supported Houthi and Saudi Arabia/UAE has an even stronger influence in the Horn. For one, it has created a new market for mercenaries, as thousands

of soldiers were recruited to fight on behalf of the human resources strapped Gulf countries. Some sources indicate that Sudanese troops reached over 40,000 at the peak of Yemen's war in 2016–2017, supporting the Saudi/UAE for which its autocratic ruler Bashir and his protégé Hemedti received huge payments. Hemedti confirmed the huge Sudanese contingent in the Yemen war when he said in 2019: "As many as 30,000 Sudanese soldiers are fighting alongside the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen", then deputy head of Sudan's ruling military council. The involvement of SAF and RSF as separate contingents and the differential rent that they received from their Gulf sponsors has played an important role in the fracturing of the Sudanese military and underwrites Hemedti's rise into prominence.

The current competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE represents the latest hegemonic rivalry perhaps with the greatest impact on the GHOA region. Seeking to fill in the power vacuum in the Gulf after the US withdrew from the region, and seeking to eclipse its much larger neighbour Saudi Arabia, UAE under its ambitious leader Mohammad bin Zeid (MbZ) is punching above its weight. UAE's interests in the region range from acquisition of ports in the Red Sea, a secure base for mercenaries, and gold and land for commercial agriculture to ensure food security. But more importantly, it seeks a client state as UAE's preferred geopolitical strategy is acting through proxies which is not only cost-effective but also enables pursuit of various interests, existing and new, as noted by a UN expert in the region:

The UAE has commercial, economic, military interests in the HoA region. But these are not the driving forces. For the UAE it is principally construct regional power through proxies. So, this is what they did in Libya; this is what they did in Yemen; this is what they did in Sudan. Having a proxy is more valuable than even the interests, because one can achieve many things with a proxy.

The democracy impediments in the GHOA region analysed at length above, from nation-building crises to power asymmetry between state and societal forces, an ill-suited winner-takes-all electoral system, the resource curse, weak regional entities, and strong external interreference are all interrelated. For instance, when there is a huge imbalance of power between state and societal actors, the nation-building crisis continues because the state employs oppressive measures against societal forces. The state would also impose a certain vision of political settlement for the country, which contributes further to nation-building crises, by creating a large mass of aggrieved ethnic groups thereby contributing to

more ethnic divisions. But then, nation-building crisis also triggers a widened, or a more imbalanced power relationship between state and societal forces because aggrieved ethnic groups would resist state power, and that would trigger more coercive measures against societal forces creating a kind of vicious cycle. Yet again, this also triggers conflict. Every struggle takes place, especially in Africa where externally driven division is rampant, not in a peaceful context, but with a lot of violence.

Conflict is also related to economic crisis, and economic crisis in turn exacerbates conflicts as well. On the other hand, autocracies create a resource curse, and extractives further entrench autocratic rule. It is the same two-way traffic between strong external interference and autocracies. The Horn's pivotal geostrategic location has attracted strong interference by major and emerging global powers who are more interested in dealing with authoritarian governments which are viewed as more dependable proxies for extractives. Autocracies respond 'well' to the geopolitical marketplace and the rent associated with it to further buttress their hold on power. The following diagram seeks to capture this dynamic interplay among the various factors that impede Democratization in the GHoA region as discussed above.




Figure 2. *The Positive Feedback Loop Circuit among Democracy-Impeding Factors in the GHoA*

Having established the factors and their connectivity, now remains the question of identifying hierarchy among them. This is to say ask, what is the most fundamental of all these factors? Where should we start, in terms of analyzing and understanding the democratic predicaments of GHoA countries, and with a seemingly regional pattern? This is important not only to make sense of the problem but also to identify implications for recommendations that answers where we should start to nurture Democratization in the region. Further, what is most fundamental to address immediately and in the short- and long-term? In terms of a

hierarchy of factors, as depicted in the diagram above, the strong power imbalance appears to be a fundamental problem in the process of Democratization in the Horn; one which blocks the onset of a peaceful struggle between state and societal forces. However, this is also the most difficult factor to tackle about which little or nothing has been done in the past. A combination of pressure from various stakeholders and incentives that encourage political regimes to concede in some areas in order to thrive might go a long way to catalyze the process of Democratization in the region.

4. Prospects of Democratization

Amidst the entrenchment of autocratic rule and proliferation of conflicts in the region, abetted by external interferences, some progress has been made. In Ethiopia, for instance, over the last five decades the Ethiopian state and society have become more inclusive of marginalized groups. The trend can be positive if we historicise current changes vis-à-vis the social landscape before the 1974 revolution. This is above all expressed in the ethno-federal reconfiguration of the Ethiopian state which delivered a modicum of self-rule within the overarching framework of the 'nationality question.' From the perspective of a liberal understanding of democracy, however, Ethiopia has indeed regressed. Still, political liberalization in Ethiopia—though it has not led to democratic transition—has contributed to democratic institution building. Notable among these is the new Human Rights Commission which is critically engaging with the government's human rights violations. The Commission also works to cultivate human rights norms, such as through the annual Human Rights Festivals. All governments have been authoritarian despite ideological differences, i.e., monarchy, military, electoral authoritarianism, and currently moving towards competitive authoritarianism. Most countries in the region have also implemented gender reform focusing on political representation of women. Ethiopia's big push in gender reform, especially in the early years of political transformation with women heads of state, e.g., the Supreme Council and head of election board, earned it the enviable status of a 'feminist Ethiopia.'³⁰ Although this is a stretch, more so given the contraction of women political representation in subsequent years, legislative reform opened the civic space for women's rights activists. More organic is the women's movement in South Sudan, which successfully negotiated to sit at the peace negotiation tables to represent women's voice.

30 <https://eu.boell.org/en/2019/11/14/feminist-ethiopia-whats-really-behind-countrys-recent-reforms>

In Sudan, women were in the forefront throughout the pro-democracy protests in 2018–2019. In fact, Alaa Salah in the white clad, the 22-year-old student and her electrifying speech during the sit-ins, is widely considered as the embodiment of Sudan's recent democratic movement. The Kenyan progressive story would be a democratically configured judiciary, which has enhanced the faith citizens have in the court system. A recent example of this would be the decision against the controversial housing levy. The government suffered a major setback in November 2023 when the High Court in Nairobi declared a housing levy Ruto introduced unconstitutional. According to the judges, the plan to raise taxes to construct affordable homes was unconstitutional and discriminatory. This was part of the financial law which provoked violent protests in July 2023. Implementation of diversity-friendly governance reforms is also a positive development in the region. These consist of the federal restricting of the Ethiopian unitary state, the largely clan-based federal system in Somalia, devolution in Kenya, and decentralization in Uganda. Federalism has also gained political traction in Sudan and South Sudan as provisions of peace agreements indicate. Apart from being better suited to manage diversity, these decentralized forms of governance have also brought the governments closer to the people.

In most Horn countries ongoing national processes have a direct bearing on Democratization. One is the peace process. Although not as comprehensive as one would like to see, a peace process in South Sudan, which ended a civil war that cost the lives of over 400,000 people, led to a transitional government, i.e., The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, in 2020. This peace agreement is still holding. The same is true in Ethiopia, in which the 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) ended the two years of devastating Tigray war which cost the lives of hundreds of people and displaced millions. Although full implementation of the agreement is lagging, it has at least silenced the guns and created a working relationship between the Tigray Interim Administration and the federal government. Similarly, national dialogs were implemented or are in the process of implementation in many Horn countries. The first was Kenya, which implemented a national dialogue after the 2007 post electoral violence that cost the lives of over a thousand people and displaced hundreds of thousands. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) forum was formed to achieve sustainable peace, stability, and justice through the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Kenya's first attempt at consociational democracy, or power-sharing arrangement between an incumbent and opposition party, and the new Constitution (2010) came out of the national dialogue process, a new constitutional order that re-

stored constitutional democracy in Kenya. Both Sudan and South Sudan also implemented a national dialogue. Whereas in Sudan, despite an impressive process of consultation, it led to the co-option of mild opponents, in South Sudan it lacked an implementation plan, and the president has parked the recommendations for 'future implementation.' The South Sudan national dialog process at least identified core governance problems and the Commission spoke truth to power when it courageously presented one of the recommendations being the two rival factions to step down and abstain from electoral competition as they were identified as the major culprits for the protracted conflict that deepened political crisis in the country.³¹ Ethiopia is in the process of implementing national dialogue. Despite a faulty start suffering from legitimacy and transparency, people still have faith in the national dialogue process, perhaps as the only option left to generate much-needed political settlement. Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan have also initiated transitional justice processes. Though there are potential problems with these national processes, they are all key in the Democratization project.

As Mengisteab convincingly argued, fragmentation of economic and institutional systems is a major impediment for Democratization. The duality between the informal traditional system and the formal state system and their respective institutional correlates has undermined popular civic participation, more so because the GHoA region is still massively rural whereas democratic politics is concentrated in urban areas. The informal traditional form of governance is not only excluded from national level governance systems, but also property rights sanctioned by it are routinely violated by the state which does not recognize them as valid. Somaliland and Ethiopia have made some progress in surpassing this duality. In Somaliland, progress is expressed in the form of the key role clan elders played in the 1991–1993 settlement that greatly contributed to political stability and their continued participation in governance in what is known as a hybrid democracy. In Ethiopia, Democratization is expressed in the form of legal pluralism that the federal system allows. Customary courts are constitutionally recognized at least with a mandate in civil matters, for example, and there is also a move towards greater recognition of customary courts in the criminal justice system with greater linkage to state courts. The Ministry of Peace has also recently carried out a study on local institutions, documenting and sorting them by their relevance to conflict resolution and human rights.³²

Traditional modes of governance could also nurture meritocratic leadership ex-

31 <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/south-sudans-people-have-spoken-peace-anyone-listening>

32 MoP. 2023. በኢትዮጵያ ለሰላም ግንባታ ፋይዳ ያላቸው ማሳበረ-ባህላዊ ተቋማትና ሥርዓቶች ሚናዎ ምደባ.

cept for those based on hereditary rule. Among the Nuer of Ethiopia and South Sudan, for instance, leaders emerge organically with their proven ability to lead in peaceful and war times (Dereje, 2011).³³ Governance in most local communities is participatory, in which discussions on vital community issues under the palaver tree is often equated as a form of traditional parliament. In a provocative article entitled, “Public Reason Under the Tree: Rawls and the African Palaver,” Fidèle Ingiyimbere (2022) argues that,

African culture has developed the practice of palaver as way of dealing with social and political questions of the community. Usually held under a tree, the palaver is the African version of deliberative democracy. They are equivalent to Rawl’s public reason as a central part of political liberalism—a mechanism for citizens to discuss about matters of common interest.³⁴

Democratic governance is well advised to learn from and develop a sensible partnership with traditional modern styles of governance. The prevailing trend, however, is for either neglect or co-option that ultimately undermines their alternative bases of legitimacy.

Starting with a very low base, nevertheless, economic growth is high across the region. In fact, East Africa is predicted to be the fastest-growing economic region globally over the next two decades, anticipated to deliver a GDP CAGR of 6.1% in real terms. This even surpasses other rapidly growing emerging and developing markets in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and other parts of Africa, notwithstanding the current high inflationary pressure partly caused by disruptions in global supply chains, and the impact of war and violent conflicts.³⁵ Ethiopia’s big push in agricultural productivity, especially in the wheat sector, if sustained, promises a stem in the right direction in ensuring food security. This is in a region with the lowest human development indicators, civil wars, and displacement. The scale of the economic crisis and how it has affected Democratization in the Horn needs to be considered. Various studies established association between economic development and democracy, though this is without a causal link. Economic development always creates a more favorable condition for democracy to take root.

33 Dereje Feyissa. 2011. *Playing different games : The paradox of the identification strategies of the Anywaa and the Nuer in the Gambella region, Western Ethiopia*. Berghahn books.

34 Fidèle Ingiyimbere. Public reason under the tree: Rawls and the African palaver. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 50 (2):281-298 (2024)

35 <https://www.euromonitor.com/article/east-africa---the-rising-economic-jewel-of-sub-saharan-africa#:~:text=>

The fragility or resilience of democracy rests in its ability to continue to deliver stability and development. Countries that transitioned to democracy in Asia are successful precisely because the regimes were able to deliver stable economic development, as argued by Slater and Wong in their book, *From Development to Democracy: The Transformation of Modern Asia* (2022). This growth trajectory in the Horn could be further bolstered if governments use the extractive sector for the benefit of the larger public good and turn a curse into a blessing along the road. The fastest rate of urbanization in Africa could also be a factor in Democratization. With 45% of its population living in urban areas, Africa is the least urbanized continent, yet with one of the highest rates of urbanization. For example, Ethiopia's current coverage of urban areas in the country is less than 20%, but urbanization is increasing rapidly, at a rate of 4.63% annually.³⁶ Although there is no causal relationship between urbanization and Democratization, studies have identified a relationship expressed in the form of cities facilitating coordinated public action and enhancing the effectiveness of uprisings, increased demand for democracy relative to dictatorship, and engendering the development of "civic capital" which enables citizens to improve their own institutions.³⁷ However, more research is needed to firmly establish such links.

The proliferation of prodemocracy social movements in cities and towns in the Horn—both on the street and online—and activism generates hope for the emergence of new social actors to assertively negotiate shared democratic space with state actors. There is a new reform momentum within the RECs, especially IGAD which has adopted a new treaty in July 2023 to fully operate under a set of rules like other regional economic communities. The treaty has replaced the agreement that gave birth to IGAD in 1996, effectively putting in place several changes, including its chair seat which will now be predictable. The chairpersonship will henceforth be on one-year rotational basis, with member states assuming office in alphabetical order. The treaty also mandated the council with dispute resolution through negotiation. Further, enclosed in the treaty is the power and process to impose sanctions. It also established that every policy organ of IGAD will have a defined number of meetings per calendar year including quarterly, biannually, and annually as applicable. The think tank should start from a high level, e.g., the new treaty is drafted by IGAD and the new IGAD leadership has good connectivity with leaders of Member States. A new treaty and active leadership provide an optimistic outlook for IGAD to engage with Democratization.

36 Solomon Benti et al. Implications of overlooked drivers in Ethiopia's urbanization: curbing the curse of spontaneous urban development for future emerging towns. *Heliyon*. **2022 Oct; 8(10): e10997**

37 Edward L. Glaeser and Bryce M Steinberg. 2016. Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change? NBER Working Paper No. 22860

5. Recommendations

The GHoA region is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the continent. Most of these conflicts are domestic, though there are rising inter-state tensions as well that have created a regional security complex. As such, the most urgent task to enable Democratization in the GHoA region is **conflict resolution**: silencing the guns so that vital national processes of peace agreements, national dialogs, and transitional justice can help generate the political stability the region so badly needs to make states more legitimate and rebuild nations on more inclusive bases. These are important conditions for democracy to take root. For this to happen synergy among these national processes needs to be created. As it stands, they are occurring in silos. There is a need to produce knowledge for strategic thinking to create synergy among these processes, so more viable, legitimate, and cohesive states emerge which is a *sin quo non* for Democratization.

The states and political regimes that represent them are too powerful vis-à-vis societal forces in the GHoA region, perhaps except Somalia. This strong power imbalance is a major stumbling block for Democratization to take root. There is a pressing need to **rebalance the power asymmetry between state and societal forces** in the region: a rebalance through incentive structures that entice incumbents to concede a democratic space and thrive. Neither democratic rights issued by the state nor contestations, whether peaceful or violent, have worked in the context of this strong imbalance of power that blocks the necessary struggle between state and societal forces around key issues from emerging. What the incentive structures could be has to be specified in each country reflecting the nature of state–society relations. This requires the creation of deliberative spaces for concerted intellectual efforts by various stakeholders.

The region needs to move away **from the prevailing majority rule to consensus democracy**. This includes the adoption of elements of consociational democracy such as inter-ethnic power-sharing arrangements and electoral reform replacing the FPTP system, and the winner-takes-all problems connected to it by proportional representation. FPTP in deeply divided societies exacerbates existing conflicts, as the stakes of losing are high. The outcome of this type of election is also often framed corporately. Think tanks could play a leading role in revisiting the old debate on democracy—its affordances vis-à-vis alternative forms of governance as well as which type of democracy better fits Horn contexts. The debate should mobilize intellectuals in each country, gradually building from the bottom up; from country-wide debate to regional. Democratization in the Horn, as elsewhere, must be a long-term investment.

Economic and institutional fragmentations have severely undermined Democratization. The duality between the massively rural subsistence economy and its institutional corollary operating in the informal traditional system, and the largely urban-based and capitalist state system has meant the exclusion of a large segment of the rural population from meaningful democratic participation; a potential huge voting block with specific interests to defend (e.g., customary land rights) but with weaker political voice. **A sensible partnership between the informal traditional and state systems** contributes a lot to democratic governance, as the experience of Somaliland's hybrid democracy indicates. Ethiopia's legal pluralism and the Ministry of Peace's documentation of traditional institutions and sorting them out by their relevance to conflict resolution and human rights is also a step in the right direction. Governments in the GHoA are well advised to drop the prevailing co-option strategy towards local institutions and traditional authorities to avoid imminent legitimacy draining. Instead, governments should engage local institutions in their respective spaces. This requires legal and policy frameworks. International best practices could be leveraged in developing a sensible partnership. South Africa is one of the most advanced in incorporating the traditional system into democratic governance, especially at the local level. However, as the experience of South Africa shows, legal and policy frameworks are important but effective partnerships between the two modes of governance need greater mandate clarification, a higher degree of participation of traditional authorities in local governments, and resourcing to traditional institutions for meaningful participation not only in decision making but also in implementing local development projects and/or service delivery. Engaging traditional institutions also helps them reform, especially in the areas of gender equality as most are predicated on patriarchy and other forms of localized hierarchy.

Tap into grassroots democratic actors both on the streets and online, especially the youth whose democracy activism is enabled by social media technologies. This is especially more pressing in the Sudan where young democratic actors (e.g., resistance committees) are excluded from the category of civilian political forces and thus do not have a seat at peace negotiation tables.

Autocracies in the region are oiled, especially in countries where significant hydrocarbons are discovered, creating the resource curse phenomenon and exacerbating conflicts. There is an urgent need to **build democratic institutions of accountability for the extractive sector** based on international best practices that fit Horn contexts. This could include a regionally networked CSO advocacy base for making the oil economy (and other extractives as well) more transpar-

Reference

- Anyanwu, J and Andrew E. O. Erhijakpor. Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa? Working Paper. No 184 – November 2013 <https://www.afdb.org/>
- Bai, T. Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case. 2019. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bates, R. Democracy in Africa: A Very Short History. *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 77 (2):1133-1148 (2010)
- Bell, D. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)
- Bentrovato, D. Rwanda, Twenty Years on Assessing the RPF's Legacy through the Views of the Great Lakes Region's New Generation. *Cahiers d'études africaines* 218 | 2015
- Dahl, R. A preface to democratic theory. 1956. The University of Chicago Press
- Dereje Feyissa. 2011. Playing Different games: The paradox of the identification strategies of the Anywaa and the Nuer in the Gambella region, Western Ethiopia. Berghan publishers.
- Fischer, J. and David Anderson. "Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa". *International Affairs*. 91(1), p.131.
- Gerenge, R. 2023. The role of the African Union in tackling democratic recession in Africa, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 30:3, 569-584
- Glaeser, E and Bryce M Steinberg. 2016. Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change? NBER Working Paper No. 22860
- González, L. I. (2018). Oil rents and patronage: the fiscal effects of oil booms in the Argentine provinces. *Comparative Politics*, 51(1), 101
- Horowitz, H. 'Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems'. *Journal of Democracy*. Volume 25, Number 2 April 2014.
- Ingiyimbere, F. Public reason under the tree: Rawls and the African palaver. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 50 (2):281-298 (2024)
- Kanyinga, K. Kenya Democracy and Political Participation. Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), March 2014.
- Kidane Mengisteab (ed.). *The Crisis of Democratization in the Greater Horn of Africa: Towards Building Institutional Foundations*. Boydell & Brewer, 2020
- Karanja, J. 'Hustlers versus Dynasties': contemporary political rhetoric in Kenya. *SN Soc Sci* (2022) 2 :230
- Landemore, H. 2020. *Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton University Press
- Lewis, A. 1965. *Politics in West Africa*. Bloomsbury Academic
- Levine, D. 1976. *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*.
- Lijphart, A. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969

Lijphart. 2002. The wave of power-sharing democracy. In *Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy*. Andrew Reynolds, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mesay Kebede መስታወት-”አምባገነን መሪዎች ለምን ይገገሙ?” Mengizem media Mestawet Reeyot Alemu with Pro. Messay Kebede Dec 7,23 (youtube.com)

MoP. 2023. በኢትዮጵያ ለሰላም ግንባታ ፋይዳ ያላቸው ማኅበረ-ባህላዊ ተቋማትና ሥርዓቶች ሚናዎ ምደባ.

Moyo, D. 2009. *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. Douglas & McIntyre.

Montesano. T. *Dynasty politics in democracy: Kenyattas, Odingas and democratic erosion in Kenya*.<https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2020/12/09/dynasty-politics-in-democracy-kenyattas-odingas-and-democratic-erosion-in-kenya/>

Nyerere. J. *One-Party Government*. Transition, No. 75/76, The Anniversary Issue: Selections from Transition, 1961-1976

Rustow, Dankwart A. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1970

Semi Yusuf. 2022. Ethiopia’s democratic predicaments State–society dynamics and the balance of power. ISS Monograph 209.

Samson A. Bezabeh, *Citizenship and the logic of sovereignty in Djibouti*, African Affairs, Volume 110, Issue 441, October 2011.

Slater, D and Joseph Wong. 2013. ‘The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental’. American Political Science Association.

Solomon Benti et al. Implications of overlooked drivers in Ethiopia’s urbanization: curbing the curse of spontaneous urban development for future emerging towns. *Heliyon*. 2022 Oct; 8(10): e10997

Steinmetz, J. 2021. *Politics, Power, and Purpose: An Orientation to Political Science*.

Stojanović, N. “Democracy, Ethnoicracy and Consociational Democracy.” *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2020, pp. 30–43.

Tilly. C. 1985. War making and state making as organized crime. In: Evans PB, Rueschemeyer D and Skocpol T (eds) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169–191

Verhoeven, H. *Surviving revolution and Democratization: the Sudan armed forces, state fragility and security competition*. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 2023; 61(3):413-437.

Vanessa, A. Staffan Lindberg & Anna Lührmann. 2021 *Waves of autocratization and Democratization: a rejoinder*. Democratization

Vosloo – Wollongong, W. 2013. *The Majority Principle in Democratic Ideology*. <https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/6a3663e1/files/uploaded/>



HORN CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

NURTURING DEMOCRACY

WITH SUPPORT FROM



ISS | INSTITUTE FOR
SECURITY STUDIES



Sweden
Sverige

www.horn-center.org
Email: info@horn-center.org